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Biotechnology proponents deem biotechnology critics \imperialists for opposing a technology that could be
used to develop improved crops for poor nations."1 Critics of the technology deride genetically engineered
products as \frankenfoods."2 Biotechnology companies claim that their products will feed the world,3 while
opponents claim that the products will lead to a bio-disaster.4 Ironically, while these heated accusations are
1Andrew Pollack, Critics of Biotechnology Are Called Imperialists, N.Y Times, February 4, 2001, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/04/weekinreview/04POLL.html>.
2Matthew Franken, Fear of Frankenfoods: A Better Labeling Standard for Genetically Modied Foods, 1 Minn. Intell.
Prop. Rev. 153, 153 (2000).
3Michael Pollan, Playing God in the Garden, N.Y. Times Mag., Oct. 25, 1998, available at 1998 WL 22330020 [hereinafter
Playing God in the Garden].
4See, e.g. <http://www.greepeace.org/ge>.
1hurled between consumer activists and biotechnology companies, the public is largely unaware that these
products are already being widely sold in American grocery stores.5
Genetically engineered foods have already made a signicant impact on the American food supply. In 1999,
genetically engineered plants were cultivated on approximately 28 million hectares of the world's land, and
this number is expected to triple within 5 years.6 The United States is one of the world's largest producers
of these products; 55% of the soybeans, 50% of the cotton and 40% of the maize grown in the U.S. is derived
from genetically engineered seeds.7 This major shift in the food supply has already impacted the public
diet, with up to two thirds of all processed foods currently sold in U.S. grocery stores containing genetically
altered ingredients.8 Moreover, the number of genetically engineered products produced in the U.S. is likely
to increase dramatically, with at least 50 genetically engineered crops approved as food products,9 and many
more products in development.10 One prominent seed producer has predicted that up to 80% of the produce
sold in America will soon contain some kind of genetic modication.11
The American public has expressed concern about the implications and risks of this technology.12 Public
anxiety about biotechnology has been driven in part by the contemporary public's distrust of the scientic
establishment and scientic evidence. The public has expressed an increased wariness towards science gener-
ally, and towards biotechnology in particular. 13 This shift in the public mind-set has been accompanied by
5Food and Drug Administration, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Report on Consumer Focus Groups on
Biotechnology, Oct 20,2000, available at <http://wwww.cfsan.fda.gov/comm/biorpt.html>. (nding that \virtually all" of
the participants indicated a desire for labeling of bioengineered foods.) [hereinafter Consumer Focus Groups]
6Philip H. Abelson & Pamela J. Hines, The Plant Revolution, 285 Science 367, (July 16, 1999), available at
<http://www.sciencemag.org>.
7Food For Thought, Economist, June 17, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7363490.
8Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Plans New Scrutiny in Areas of Biotechnology, New York Times, January 18, 2001, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/18/health/18REGS.html>.
9Philip R. Reilly, Public Concern About Genetics, 1 Ann. Rev. Genomics Hum. Genetics 485, 499 (2000).
10Next Generation Biotech Products Will Face Traditional Labeling Issues in U.S., Food Chemical News, July 13, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 10981464.
11Scott Kilman & Jonathan Friedland, Growth Industry: As Geneticists Develop and Appetite for Greens, Mr. Romo
Fluorishes, Wall St. J. Eur., Jan. 28, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJE 5506210.
12Reilly, supra note 9 at 498.
13Michael A. Whittaker, Reevaluating the Food and Drug Administration's Stand on Labeling Genetically Engineered Foods,35
San Diego L. Rev. 1215, 1222-3 (1998).
2a diluted degree of trust and respect in the opinions of and the scientic establishment.14 Public concerns
have also been raised about the nature of the technology,15 the speed with which this technology has been
introduced,16 and the rapid commercialization of the genetically engineered products.17
These anxieties about genetic engineering are further exacerbated by the fact that the focus of this contro-
versy centers on food. People are likely to express special interest and concern about food{an extremely
personal and daily part of life.18 Dennis Kucinich, a member of the House of Representatives representing
Ohio, has stated that \there is nothing more personal than food."19 Diane Toops, the news and trend editor
of a food trade magazine, has noted that people are often especially distrustful of changes in food products,
citing the \consumer mantra: don't muck with my food."20 Even Fred H. Degnan, a legal commentator
supportive of the FDA's current policies towards agricultural biotechnology, has acknowledged consumers'
heightened level of concerned about the health eects of agricultural biotechnology, noting \the unease felt
by many about the use of gene technology in foods|the use of technology in a context that touches our lives
daily and personally."21 According to Carol Tucker Foreman of Consumer Federation of America:
Food is special. We eat to sustain life and health. Since food is so basic to us both physically
and emotionally, it is really not surprising that consumers are extremely averse to any food-
related risk, especially if that risk is perceived as imposed by someone else beyond our
individual control and without any countervailing benet. In short, we eat because it is
good for us, not because it benets those who grow, process or sell food.22
Tied to this elemental conservatism about the application of novel scientic techniques to the food supply is
a growing consumer awareness of the connection between diet and health.23 In fact, the popularity of such
14Derek Burke, Time for Voices to be Raised , 405 Nature 509 (2000), available at <<http://www.nature.com>.
15Philip R. Reilly, Public Concern About Genetics, 1 Ann. Rev. Genomics & Hum. Genetics 485, 502 (2000).
16Id. at 502.
17Paul Smaglik, Educated US Public Get More Wary of Genetic Engineering, 405 Nature 988, 988 (2000).
18Nevertheless, Americans' cultural ties to food are less strong than that seen in European countries. See, e.g., Sticky Labels,
Economist, April 29, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7362891; Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union
and the United States: Dierent Cultures, Dierent Laws, 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 525, 526 (1998).
19Jerey Kluger et al., Time Intl., Sept. 20, 1999, available at 1999 WL 25725566.
20Marian Burros, Irradiated Beef: In Markets, Quietly, N.Y. Times, February 28, 2001, available at
<<http:/www.nytimes.com/2001/02/28/living/28WELL.html>>.
21Fred H. Degnan, Biotechnology and the Food Label: A Legal Perspective, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 301, 301 (2000).
23Steven B. Steinborn & Kyra A. Todd, The End of Paternalism: A New Approach to Food Labeling, 54 Food & Drug L.J.
3\functional foods" as margarine containing chemicals designed to lower cholesterol, attest to the fact that
\[t]he distinction between food and drugs is increasingly blurred."24 Sensitized to the relationship between
food and health, the public may be especially wary of any unfamiliar food processing method for fear that
the processing might pose unknown health risks.
Motivated by these concerns about genetically engineered products, an increasing number of consumer,
environmental, and even farming groups have recently been calling for a greater degree of regulation of
genetically engineered foods. Some national politicians25 and state legislatures26 have even taken up the
cause. One of the main policy changes advocated by these groups is a call for mandatory labeling of
genetically engineered whole foods and foods containing genetically engineered ingredients. Mandatory
labeling of genetically engineered foods is also widely supported by the public. 27 Despite this demonstrated
public interest in a mandatory labeling policy, the FDA has consistently resisted calls for mandatory labeling
genetically engineered foods, and foods containing genetically modied ingredients.
This paper will examine the arguments and motivations underlying the FDA stand against mandatory
labeling of genetically engineered foods and ingredients. Part I of the paper will describe FDA's current
regulatory policy towards genetically engineered foods. Part II will advance the theoretical basis for the
labeling argument. Part III will explore the FDA and industry's arguments against labeling. Part IV
will evaluate those FDA and industry responses. Part V will examine how predictions about public risk
perceptions may have shaped the FDA's labeling stance. Finally, Part VI will examine the realities facing
the government and industry that may aect the direction of labeling policy in the future.
401, 401 (1999).
24Dysfunctional, Economist, Sept. 11, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7364483.
25Jerey Kluger et al., Time Intl., Sept. 20, 1999, available at 1999 WL 25725566.
26Andrew Pollack, Farmers Joining State Eorts Against Bioengineered Crops, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 2001, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com>.
27Food and Drug Administration, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Report on Consumer Focus Groups on
Biotechnology, Oct 20,2000, available at <http://wwww.cfsan.fda.gov/comm/biorpt.html>. (nding that \virtually all" of
the participants indicated a desire for labeling of bioengineered foods.) [hereinafter Consumer Focus Groups]
4I. FDA Regulation of Genetically Engineered Foods
A. Basic Regulatory Posture.
In 1992, the FDA released its rst detailed regulatory statement regarding genetically modied foods.28
Under the 1992 policy, the agency committed itself to regulating genetically engineered foods under the
same statutory and regulatory framework as conventionally produced foods.29 In so doing, the agency
declared that any regulatory inquiry would focus on the nal food product rather than at any process
involved in the production of that food.30 The agency stated the regulatory status of these foods hinges
on the \objective characteristics"31 and \intended use[s]"32 of the nal food product, and that the scientic
techniques used to produce such foods would be relevant only to the extent that the processes would provide
insight into the \safety or nutritional characteristics of the nished food."33 In indicating that the safety
review of bioengineered foods would be limited to the nished food product, the FDA signaled that it did
not believe the process of bioengineering itself to merit increased regulatory concern.34
The 1992 policy focused on the similarities between agricultural bioengineering techniques and traditional
28Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22984 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Policy]
291992 Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22990.
301992 Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22984.
311992 Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22984.
321992 Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22984.
331992 Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22984.
341992 Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22984-22985. More recent statements James Maryanski, the FDA's Biotechnology Coordinator
of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition have indicated that the FDA's safety evaluations of genetically modied
foods involves an examination of both the nal food product and the food production techniques. Statements of James H.
Maryanski, Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, United States Senate (October 7, 1999),
available at <http://www.vm.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/st991007.html> [hereinafter Maryanski Statement]. Nevertheless, despite
this apparent shift in stated attitude, FDA's regulatory classication of these foods, or at least its public statements have
generally indicated that the FDA does not feel the need for any dramatic intensication in the regulatory scrutiny applied
to genetically modied foods. Maryansky elaborated \Although the study of the nal product ultimately holds the answer to
whether or not a product is safe to eat, knowing the techniques used to create the product helps in understanding what questions
to ask in reviewing the product's safety. That's the way the FDA regulates both traditional food products and products derived
through biotechnology." Id.
5plant breeding techniques. The agency described the application of bioengineering techniques to foods as
merely part of a continuum of methods of \genetic modication techniques"35 that includes traditional plant
breeding techniques.36 FDA characterized agricultural biotechnology techniques as merely \extensions at
the molecular level of traditional methods"37 and predicted that these techniques \will be used to achieve
the same goals as pursued with traditional plant breeding."38 It dened those common goals generally
as the \development of new plant varieties with enhanced agronomic and quality characteristics."39 The
FDA based this conclusion on ndings that (1) genetic engineering is used only to introduce \only a limited
number of well-characterized genes" into the food crop,40 (2) that the transferred genes produce \common
food substances" or substances that produce or alter fatty acids, or carbohydrates,41 and (3) that those
introduced food substances \are well characterized and not known to be toxic and they would be digested to
normal metabolites in the same manner that the body handles the thousands of dierent proteins, fat and
carbohydrates that make up our diet today."42
In basing its regulatory policy on these conclusions, FDA created a regulatory policy premised on predictions
about the direction that agricultural biotechnology would take in the future. After all, there was no guaran-
tee that only certain well-characterized genes would be introduced through agricultural biotechnology, nor
that such genes would only produce common food substances. The technology imposes no such limitations
on the scope of introduced substances.43 Moreover, some of the most prevalent agricultural biotech products
on the market today are characterized and marketed not for their aect on common food substances such as
35The FDA uses the term genetically modied food to refer to both the products of agricultural biotechnology, and the
products of traditional breeding techniques. The EU generally uses the term genetically modied interchangeably with the term
genetically engineered, both of which are used to describe the products of agricultural biotechnology. Maryanski Statement,
supra note 34 at 2.
3657 Fed. Reg. at 22985.
3757 Fed. Reg. at 22991.
3857 Fed. Reg. at 22991.
3957 Fed. Reg. at 22986.
40Maryanski Statement, supra note 34 at 3.
41Id.at 4.
42Id.at 4.
43Lara Beth Winn, Special Labeling Requirements for Genetically Engineered Food: How Sound are the Analytical Frameworks
Used by FDA and Food Producers, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 667, 668 (1999).
6proteins and fatty acids, but for their pesticidal or herbicidal eects. Bt corn was engineered for its pesticidal
eects,44 and Roundup Ready soybeans was developed for its herbicide-tolerance.45 Together, in 1999, these
two products alone accounted for over 50 million acres of American farmland.46
Nevertheless, the 1992 policy consistently emphasized the similarities between genetic engineering and other
traditional plant breeding techniques, and assumed that genetic engineering would be used for exactly the
same purposes as traditional breeding techniques. For instance, even though the development of agricul-
tural biotechnology was clearly the impetus for the development of the new policy, and the key focus of the
document, the words biotechnology and genetic engineering appear nowhere in the title of the notice: \State-
ment of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties."47 The document further stated that the policy
set out in the notice was to cover all \foods derived from new plant varieties, including plants developed
by recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) techniques."48 Maryanski's recent remarks before the Senate
conrm FDA's continuing commitment to emphasizing the similarity between genetically engineered foods
and traditionally produced foods.49 The FDA has taken great pains to emphasize that it will not distinguish
between genetically engineered foods and traditional foods for regulatory purposes.
Having determined that agricultural biotechnology was not conceptually dierent from traditional food
breeding techniques, the agency also determined that the foods would not require any special regulatory
scrutiny. The agency set out its goal as \ensuring that these new products meet the same safety standards
as traditional foods."50 This regulatory commitment to treating genetically engineered foods exactly the
44Karen A. Goldman, Labeling of Genetically Modied Foods: Legal and Scientic Issues, 12 Geo. Int'l. Envtl. L. Rev
717, 748 (2000)
45Karen A. Goldman, Labeling of Genetically Modied Foods: Legal and Scientic Issues, 12 Geo. Int'l. Envtl. L. Rev.
717, 751 (2000). In 1999, of the 21.6 million hectares of genetically engineered soybeans were grown, and 11.1 hectares of
genetically engineered corn were grown. See Dan Ferber, Risks and Benets: GM Crops in the Cross Hairs, 286 Science 1662,
available at <http://www.sciencemag.org>.
46Reilly, supra note 9 at 498.
4757 Fed. Reg. 22984, 22984.
4857 Fed. Reg 22984, at 22984.
49Maryanski Statement, supra note 34 at 2. (\Bioengineered foods and food ingredients (including food additives) must
adhere to the same standards of safety under the Act that apply to their conventional counterparts. This means that these
products must be as safe as the traditional foods in the market.")
50Maryanski Statement, supra note 34 at 1.
7same as other foods, of course, is the logical endpoint of the FDA's belief that these foods truly are the same.
Accordingly, the FDA committed itself to a policy that focused its safety analysis on the nal food product
rather than the technology used, and that assumed the existing regulatory framework would be sucient
to address any potential safety concerns that might be raised by bioengineered food products. Again, those
conclusions were based on an underlying conviction about the fundamental similarity between bioengineered
food products and foods derived from more traditional food production techniques. Moreover, despite some
recent tinkering with the regulatory requirements set out in the 1992 policy,51 the FDA's has remained
committed to the position set out in 1992 that the legal status of genetically engineered foods remains the
same as that of other traditionally derived foods.52
B. Allergencity
The 1992 policy did acknowledge the possibility that a gene transferred through agricultural biotechnology
techniques might cause allergenicity issues for the engineered food. In response to this risk, the FDA noted
that producers of foods transferring genes from organisms known to cause allergies should consult with the
agency in order to develop a testing protocol for the engineered organism, and suggested that labeling may
be warranted if the food contains a \known or suspect allergen."53 However, the FDA admitted that it is
\unaware of any practical method to predict or assess the potential for proteins not previously found in food
to induce allergenicity."54 Thus, with regard to allergenicity testing for transferred genes not previously
found in food, the FDA position is ambiguous, simply stating that the \degree of testing these new proteins
should be commensurate with any safety concern raised by the objective characteristics of the protein."55
Unfortunately, according to Dr. Goldberg of the Environmental Defense Fund, \most proteins added to
51See 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 and 66 Fed. Reg. at 4839.
5266 Fed. Reg. at 4711.
5357 Fed. Reg at 22987.
54David A. Kessler et al., The Safety of Foods Developed by Biotechnology, 256 Science 1747, 1832 (June 26, 1992).
55Id.
8foods via genetic engineering cannot be tested for allergenicity."56
C. Regulation as Additives
In accordance with the FDA's determination to apply the current regulatory structure to bioengineered foods,
the FDA stated that substances added to food through genetic modications would be regulated as addi-
tives if those same substances would be considered additives had they been added through traditional food
processing methods.57 Food additives are dened in 21 C.F.R. x 170.3(e)(1) to \include all substances...the
intended use of which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, either in their
becoming a component of food or otherwise aecting the characteristics of food."58 Generally, materials
containing food additives will be considered adulterated if their presence in food presents a \'reasonable pos-
sibility' that consumption of the food will be injurious to health."59 The FDA determined that application
of the food additive regulations in the case of genetically engineered foods would involve an analysis of the
\transferred genetic material and the intended expression product or products."60
However, the 1992 policy statement indicated that most transferred genetic material would be exempted
from the food additive requirements as falling under the \generally recognized as safe" exemption to the
food additive provisions61 and would thus avoid the stringent safety requirements normally applied to food
additives.62 The FDA argued that because \[n]ucleic acids are present in the cells of every living organism,
56Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond, supra note 22 at 61.
57Maryanski Statement, supra note 34 at 3.
5821 C.F.R. x 170.3(e)(1).
5957 Fed. Reg. at 22989, citing United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399 (1914).
6057 Fed. Reg. at 22990.
6157 Fed. Reg. at 22990.
62Under 21 C.F.R. x 170.3(i) producers of food additives must \demonstrate to a reasonable certainty that no harm will
result from the intended use of the additive." 57 Fed. Reg. at 22989.
9including every plant and animal used for food by humans or animals,"63 the transfer of nucleic acids through
genetically engineering could be \presumed to be GRAS."64
Interestingly, the 1992 policy acknowledged that the agency has the authority to reevaluate the GRAS and
food additive status of a food that has undergone \signicant alteration by breeding and selection."65 Al-
though not cited in the 1992 policy, the FDA also has the authority to review the GRAS status of foods
\modied by processes rst introduced into commercial use after January 1, 1958."66 Genetically engineered
foods clearly meet this standard, since genetic modications clearly were not in commercial use until well
after this statutory deadline. Moreover, the FDA also has authority to review the GRAS status of \distil-
lates, isolates, extracts, and concentration of extracts of GRAS substances,"67 and of \substances of natural
biological origin intended for consumption for other than their nutrient properties."68 Genetically engineered
foods also t both of these criteria. The nucleic acids that the FDA claims GRAS status for are actually \ex-
tracts" from foods that the FDA claims are GRAS, and most of the material currently transferred through
genetic engineering controls pesticidal or herbicidal eects, not for their \nutrient properties."
Thus, under 21 C.F.R x 170.30(f), the FDA has multiple sources of authority to review the GRAS status of
genetically engineered foods. In fact, the FDA arguable has committed itself to reviewing the GRAS status
of these foods in that regulation.69 Nevertheless, rather than invoking this authority, the agency merely
cited the historical rarity of GRAS review of plants altered by plant breeding and selection because \these
foods have been widely recognized and accepted as safe."70 In essence, the FDA disregarded its authority to
review the GRAS status of foods modied by processes introduced into commercial use after the statutory
6357 Fed. Reg. at 22990.
6457 Fed. Reg. at 22990.
6557 Fed. Reg. at 22990, citing 21 C.F.R. pt. 170.30(f)(2).
6621 C.F.R. pt. 170.30(f)(1).
6721 C.F.R. x 170.30(f)(3).
6821 C.F.R. x170,30(f)(6).
69The statute reads: \The status of the following food ingredients will be reviewed and armed as GRAS or determined to
be a food additive or prior to a prior sanction." 21 C.F.R. x 170.30(f).
7057 Fed. Reg. at 22990.
10cut-o. Most noteworthy about this analysis is the fact that the FDA deliberately chose to regulate these
foods under the GRAS exception rather than as food additives.71
Although FDA has the authority to regulate genetic material transferred through biotechnology as food
additives, it presumed that those foods would fall under the \generally recognized as safe" exception to the
food additive regulations. The FDA implicitly acknowledged that it was not exercising its full regulatory
authority towards genetically engineered materials when it stated that it \intends to use its food additive
authority to the extent necessary to protect public health...FDA will...require food additive petitions in
cases where safety questions exist sucient to warrant formal premarket review by FDA to ensure public
health protection." 72 Moreover, the FDA went further to state that \minor variations in molecular structure
that do not aect safety would not ordinarily aect the GRAS status of the substance, and thus, would not
ordinarily require regulation of the substance as a food additive."73 The logic of this statement is circuitous;
however, since the entire focus of the additive inquiry is whether or not the added substance aects safety.
The only way to determine whether \minor variations in molecular structure" do or do not aect safety
would be an additive-type analysis. However, the agency insists that the additive analysis is only required
in cases in which the safety of the food additive is already in question. This statement clearly signals a FDA
intention to use its food additive authority sparingly.
Because the FDA allows genetically engineered foods to elude classication as food additives under the GRAS
exception, genetically engineered food producers are exempted from the strict additive safety standards.74
The FDA essentially stated that genetically engineered foods will only be held to the food additive standards
in certain limited circumstances, particularly when the added genetic material already occurs in foods cur-
71Perhaps the agency noted this authority in the 1992 in order to give it exibility and preserve its ability to regulate
genetically engineered materials more stringently in the future. Or perhaps the agency was simply asserting the scope of its
regulatory power generally.
7257 Fed. Reg. at 22990.
7357 Fed. Reg. at 22990.
74Under the food additive provisions, \'safe' or `safety' means that there is a reasonable certainty in the minds of competent
scientists that the substance is not harmful under the intended conditions of use." 21 C.F.R. x 170.3(i).
11rently sold on the market.75 In place of applying the additive standards, the 1992 policy provided a detailed
section titled \Guidance to Industry for Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties"76 that was designed to
\provide[] [manufacturers with] a basis for determining whether new plant varieties are as safe and nutritious
as their parental varieties."77 This section outlines a \decision tree" approach78 for the industry to guide
these safety determinations.
D. Labeling
The FDA determined in 1992 that bioengineered modied foods do not require special labeling, and the
agency has adhered to that position ever since. The agency's labeling authority is derived mainly from
section 403 of the act which dealing with misbranded food. Under section 403(i) the food label must bear
the common or usual name of the food,79 or, alternatively, an \appropriately descriptive term."80 In addition,
the \label must reveal all facts that are material in light of representations made or suggested by labeling
or with respect to consequences which may result from use."81 The FDA has interpreted these statutory
provisions as requiring labeling if the genetically engineered food \diers from its traditional counterpart
7557 Fed. Reg. at 22990. (\When the substance present in the food is one that is already present at generally comparable or
greater levels in currently consumed foods, there is unlikely to be a safety question sucient to call into question the presumed
GRAS status of such naturally occurring substances and thus warrant formal premarket review and approval by FDA.")
7657 Fed. Reg. at 22991.
7757 Fed. Reg. at 22992.
7857 Fed. Reg. at 22985.
7957 Fed. Reg. at 22991, citing 21 U.S.C. x 343(i)
8057 Fed. Reg. at 22991, citing 21 U.S.C. part 101.3.
8157 Fed. Reg. at 22991, citing 21 U.S.C. x 343(a); 21 U.S.C. x 321(n). Under 21 U.S.C. x 343(a), \A food shall be deemed
to be misbranded...if its labeling is [sic] false or misleading in any particular, or (2) in the case of food to which section 350 of
this title applies, its advertising is false or misleading in a material respect or its labeling is in violation of section 350(b)(2) of
this title." 21 U.S.C. x 321(n) states that \in determining whether the labeling or advertising is misleading there shall be taken
into account (among other things) not only representations made or suggested by statement, word, device, or any combination
thereof, but also the extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts material in light of such representations or
material with respect to consequences which may result from the use of the article to which the labeling or advertising relates
under the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling or advertising thereof or under such conditions of use as are customary
or usual."
12such that the common or usual name no longer applies to the new food, or if a safety or usage issue exists
to which consumers must be alerted."82
Because FDA considers biotechnology to be simply an extension of traditional food production techniques,
it does not consider the use of these processes to be material information for labeling purposes.83 Thus FDA
stated that it would not require labeling for genetically engineered foods because:
The agency is not aware of any information showing that the foods derived by these new methods
dier from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way, or that, as a class, foods developed by the
new techniques present any dierent or greater safety concern than foods developed by traditional
plant breeding. For this reason, the agency does not believe that the method of development of a
new plant variety (including the use of new techniques including recombinant DNA techniques) is
normally material information within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. x 321(n) and would not usually be
required to be disclosed in labeling for the food."84 [italics added]
The FDA argued that genetically engineered foods do not need to be labeled because they are no dierent
and do not pose any dierent risks than their conventional counterparts. More recently Maryanski has de-
ned the scope of the FDA's labeling authority extremely narrowly stating that, \Labeling by law, is limited
to identifying signicant changes in a food's composition, and it must not mislead consumers."85
Under this narrow construction of its labeling authority, the FDA determined that information regarding
genetic engineering techniques would only be \material" for labeling purposes if one of four conditions were
met. Labeling would be required only if (1) the bioengineered food were \signicantly dierent from its tra-
ditional counterpart such that the common or usual name no longer adequately describes the new food"; (2)
\if an issue exist[ed] for the food or a constituent of the food regarding how the food is used or consequences
of its use"; (3) \if a bioengineered food has a signicantly dierent nutritional property" than the traditional
counterpart; or (4) if it \includes an allergen that consumers would not expect to be present based on the
8257 Fed. Reg. at 22991.
8357 Fed. Reg. at 22984. See also Larry Thompson, Are Bioengineered Foods Safe?, FDA Consumer (January February
2000) available at <http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/dms/fdbioeng.html> in which FDA Commissioner Henney states \We are
not aware of any information that foods developed through genetic engineering dier as a class in quality safety, or any other
attribute from foods developed through conventional means. That's why there has been no requirement to add a special label
saying that they are bioengineered."
85Maryanski Statement, supra note 34.
13name of the food."86 Notably, consumer expectations are only ever mentioned are in the context of food
allergens. Furthermore, the agency has explicitly stated that it will \not require disclosure in labeling of
information solely on the basis of consumers' desire to know."87
E.
Recent Developments
In response to public criticism of its policy toward genetically engineered foods, the FDA has recently
announced a number of modications of the 1992 policy. On January 18, 2001, the FDA announced that
it was providing the agricultural biotechnology industry with draft guidance entitled \Voluntary Labeling
Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering."88 Although the FDA
acknowledged most of the labeling comments it has received requested mandatory labeling,89 the agency
reiterated its opposition to mandatory labeling. The FDA specically argued that those calling for labeling
had not demonstrated that any of the \bioengineered foods already on the market...[have] adverse health
eects,"90 and characterized the calls for mandatory labeling as merely \expressions of concern about the
unknown."91 Thus, it concluded that it was \still not aware of any data or other information that would
form a basis for concluding that the fact that a food or its ingredients was produced using bioengineering is
a material fact."92 Given the agency's conviction that genetically modied foods are not materially dierent
from conventionally derived foods,93 the FDA appears to shift the burden of proof on the safety issue away
86Id..
87U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, FDA's Policy for Foods Developed
through Biotechnology, 1995, 7, available at <http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/biopolcy.html>.
88Draft Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have not been Developed Using
Bioengineering, 66 Fed. Reg. 4839, 4839 (January 18, 2001). [hereinafter Draft Guidance]
89Draft Guidance, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4840.
90Draft Guidance, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4840.
91Draft Guidance, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4840.
92Draft Guidance, 66 Fed. Reg. 4839, 4840.
93Larry Thompson, Are Bioengineered Foods Safe, FDA Consumer, Jan Feb 2000, Interview with FDA Commissioner Jane
14from the food producers and towards advocates mandatory labeling. In addition, the FDA was careful to
frame the voluntary labeling standards as aiding manufacturers to satisfy idiosyncratic consumer preferences
rather than as aiding consumers in making informed purchasing decisions. 94 Moreover, in so doing, the
FDA reiterated that it does not consider the use of bioengineering to be a material fact.95
In addition, the 1992 determination that genetically engineered foods do not merit new regulatory struc-
tures notwithstanding, in 1996 the FDA provided the industry with guidelines for a voluntary consultation
program with the FDA regarding potential regulatory issues to be addressed before placing genetically engi-
neered foods on the market.96 On January 18, 2001, the FDA proposed making the voluntary consultation
into a mandatory consultation program.97 The proposed rule would \require the submission to the agency
of data and information regarding plant-derived bioengineered foods at least 120 days prior to the commer-
cial distribution of such foods."98 This change in policy is especially notable because in 1992, an article
in Science authored by then Commissioner Kessler and other FDA ocials stated that formal pre-market
review requirements for genetically modied foods would \waste [FDA] resources and not advance public
health."99 Although the proposed \pre-market notication" requirements are probably not as comprehensive
or as resource intensive as the \pre-market review" that Commissioner Kessler had in mind,100 the shift in
policy between 1992 and 2001 is notable. These policy changes were eected largely in response to consumer
E. Henney, M.D., available at <http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/dms/fdbioeng.html>.
9466 Fed. Reg. 4839, 4840. The FDA stated, \[w]e are providing guidance to assist manufacturers who wish to label their
foods voluntarily as being made with or without the use of bioengineered ingredients."
95Id.
96Guidance on Consultation Procedures: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, latest version available at
<http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/consulpr.html>.
97Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 (January 18, 2001).
9866 Fed. Reg. 4706, at 4707.
99David A. Kessler, Michael R. Taylor, James H. Maryanski, Eric L. Flamm, Linda S. Kahl, The Safety of Foods Developed
by Biotechnology, 256 Science 1748 (June 26, 1992), available at <http://www.sciencemag.org>.
10061 Fed. Reg. at 4711.
15demands for greater transparency of the review process voiced during public hearings held by the FDA.101
II.
The Argument For Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered Foods
A. The Consumer Right to Know
Despite FDA's assurances that genetic engineering is not a material fact, and that genetic engineering is
a perfectly safe process, some consumer groups,102 environmental groups,103 national politicians,104 and
even some farming organizations105 advocate mandatory labeling of foods containing genetically modied
ingredients. Arguments for labeling of genetically engineered foods often cite a variety of justications,
including: the possible allergenicity of genetically engineered foods,106 unknown long term health impacts
of bioengineered foods,107 the potential for environmental damage posed by these foods,108 and religious
considerations109 as reasons that consumers may need labeling information. These groups contend that
labeling is the only way for consumers with these concerns to avoid genetically engineered foods. Consumers
101Press Release, US Department of Health and Human Services, FDA Announces Proposal and Draft Guidance for Food
Developed Through Biotechnology (January 17, 2001), available at <http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/hhbioen3.html>.
102See Thomas O. McGarity & Patricia I. Hansen, Breeding Distrust: An Assessment and Recommendations for Im-
proving the Regulation of Plant Derived Genetically Modied Foods, Executive Summary, January 11, 2001, available at
<http://www.biotech-info.net/Breeding Distrust.html>
103See, e.g., <http://www.greenpeaceusa.org/ge/>.
104See, e.g., Sharon Shmickle, Genetic Engineering of Foodstus Sows Debate over Labeling, Star Tribune Newspaper of
the Twin Cities, Oct. 18, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7511348 (describing Kucinich's sponsorship of a bill requiring mandatory
labeling of genetically engineered foods).
105Mandatory labeling is supported by the American Corn Growers Association. See Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and
Beyond, supra note 22 at 218. The organization's representative stated, \We recognize that biotechnology companies have
made a sizeable investment in the research and development of GMOs. That is not our concern. Our concern is the investment
that the American farmer makes in purchasing, planting, nurturing and harvesting of crops that may not have a readily available
market." Id.





16themselves note that they have no way of knowing whether or not a food product is bioengineered or contains
bioengineered ingredients without labeling, and indicate a strong preference for the labeling of such foods.110
Although all of these consumer concerns stand as independent justications for labeling, the rhetorical force
of these arguments is derived from an even more basic argument: that consumers have a right to know what
they are eating. As stated by Representative Dennis Kucinich, a Democrat from Ohio who has actively
advocating the labeling of bioengineered foods, \American consumers must have the right to choose what
foods they and their families eat."111 Although the call for labeling has been triggered by consumer unease
with agricultural biotechnology, this labeling argument draws on basic assumptions about the public's rights
as participants in democracy and as participants in a market economy.
B. The Appeal of the Argument for Labeling.
Agricultural biotechnology has triggered a number of basic societal fears: heightened concerns about the
safety of food, distrust of government, distrust of the scientic establishment, and distrust of multinational
corporations. Because consumers and consumer groups are likely to be inuenced by one or more of those
fears when they consider the issue of genetically engineered foods, it is understandable that they would
express interest in strengthening applicable regulations. Nevertheless, the calls for labeling of genetically
modied foods are qualitatively dierent from demands for other kinds of government regulation.
Demands for mandatory labeling are premised on key assumptions about the kind, not just the degree, of
regulation that is appropriate, and about which actors should be equipped to make decisions about the
growth and development of this technology. FDA's current policy generally rests on the assumptions that
110Consumer Focus Groups, supra note 5 at 4.
111Sharon Schmickle, Genetic Engineering of Foodstus Sows Debate over Labeling, Star Tribune Newspaper of the Twin
Cities, Oct. 18, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7511348.
17agricultural biotechnology does not pose any \unique" risks{that it is merely an extension of traditional
breeding techniques, and that information about the application of this process is therefore not material.
On an institutional level, FDA's policy also assumes that the (1) government and industry scientists, not
consumers, are best positioned to determine whether or not information is \material" for labeling purposes;
(2) consumers should trust government agencies to make rational and responsible decisions about the extent,
speed, and nature of the entrance of this technology into the marketplace; and (3) labeling policy decisions
should and can be non-political, i.e. based solely on scientic evidence.
The recent calls for labeling represent fundamental challenges to these basic institutional premises. Argu-
ments for labeling represent a fundamentally dierent understanding of how power and information should
be distributed between the agricultural biotechnology industry, the FDA, and consumers. In fact, advocates
for labeling would generally posit that (1) only consumers can ultimately determine what information is
\material;" (2) consumers should have a right to use their buying power to aect the extent, speed, and
nature of the entrance of biotechnology into the marketplace; and perhaps most importantly (3) any decision
about labeling policy is political, and science alone cannot determine public policy. These conicting view-
points are premised not on dierent understandings of the technology itself, but on dierent understandings
of proper balance of power between the FDA, consumers and the industry.
C.
Labeling is generally a politically palatable compromise.
Labeling is an extremely palatable regulatory position because it accommodates both public apprehensions
about the entrance of this technology into the marketplace, and a growing skepticism about the eectiveness
of government agencies and regulations. For consumers nervous about the application of biotechnology to our
18food supply, but also distrustful of government agencies, labeling oers an extremely attractive solution be-
cause it allows consumers to make decisions for themselves, as opposed to \command and control" regulation
regimes in which the government directly interposes itself between the regulated industry and consumers. In
the current environment of deep distrust of the adequacy of both unregulated market forces and government
regulatory structures to adequately address the public's needs and concerns,112 informational remedies oer
\one of the few weapons available with which people can further their interests."113 Such remedies, at least
arguably, transfer power from both the regulated industry and the government to the consumer.
Because informational remedies are seen as empowering consumers to make decisions about their exposure
to particular risks without directly interposing government regulations between producers and consumers,
these remedies have resonance with a broad spectrum of the populace. These remedies are likely to appeal
to \equally to conservatives, who applaud `market facilitation' and `bootstrapping,' and to liberals, who
favor `empowerment and the `right to know."'114 Moreover, these kinds of solutions are likely to appeal
particularly to the Baby Boom generation's sense of \active, informed consumerism."115
1.
Public Ignorance about Genetic Engineering.
The public's interest in informational remedies notwithstanding, one of the most disturbing aspects of the
move to agricultural biotechnology is the lack of public awareness of this issue. Notably, there is increasing
evidence that Americans are not fully aware of the extent to which genetically engineered foods have come to
112William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1701,
1707 (1999).
113William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1701,
1707 (1999).
114Sage, supra note 112, at 1825-6.
115Sage, supra note 112, at 1825-6
19be present in a large part of our food supply. In fact, a recently issued report on consumer focus group studies
conducted by the FDA conrmed that Americans by and large are unaware of the impact that genetically
engineered foods are already having on their diets:
After being presented with a factual account of the extent to which certain grain crops in the
US are being produced from bioengineered seed and the extent to which bioengineered ingredients
are present in processed foods, most participants expressed great surprise that biotechnology has
become so pervasive in the U.S. food supply. Even among participants who considered themselves
well-informed about biotechnology, many registered amazement.116
2.
Public Value Based Arguments for Labeling.
Given this public lack of knowledge about the entrance of biotechnology into the marketplace, labeling would
serve important societal values and goals. Cass R. Sunstein has developed a case for informational remedies
based on liberty considerations, arguing that \[i]f people are unaware of the consequences of their choices,
they are, to that extent, less free."117 This proposition makes intuitive sense: one of the basic assumptions
of liberty is the ability to make meaningful personal choices.
Furthermore, Sunstein also points out that providing citizens with information facilitates the functioning of
deliberative democracy by allowing citizens to fully \engage in their monitoring and deliberative tasks."118
He argues that providing citizens with information about both governmental and market activities allow
citizens to \oversee government action and also to assess the need for less, more, or dierent regulation."119
117Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 653, 655
(1993).
118Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. Penn. L.Rev. 613
(1999). Sage makes a similar argument about mandatory disclosure laws when he states, \Mandatory disclosure laws have a role
in bringing dicult decisions into the open and providing the deliberative process with the information needed to resolve them.
In a representative democracy, citizens often insist that deliberations that aect them be conducted in public view." William
M. Sage, Regulating through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 Colum L. Rev. 1701, 1803-4 (1999).
Moreover, Sage quotes March and Olsen in arguing \a democratic polity requires a rich m elange of information and suers
when there is a monopolistic control over information or when an expert community is monolithic in belief or organization."
Id.at 1821, citing James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Democratic Governance, 82-3 (1995).
119Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. Penn. L. Rev. 613,
625 (1999)
20Indeed, regardless of one's personal view of agricultural biotechnology, one of the key assumptions of an open
and free democratic society is that citizens can most eectively govern themselves when they are armed with
information about government and marketplace activities directly aecting their lives.120
If consumers are not aware of what is contained in the food they are eating, or the food processing tech-
niques that have been applied to those foods, they are not in any position to hold the government or the
food producers accountable for the safety of those foods generally, or for the particular regulations that have
been applied to those foods. Again, regardless of one's view of the safety of agricultural biotechnology, it
is clear that consumers cannot eectively oversee government regulations about biotechnology unless they
are aware that this technology is being applied. At this point, it is impossible to measure consumer support
for FDA's current regulation of agricultural biotechnology because consumers are simply not aware of the
extent to which the products of agricultural biotechnology have already entered their diets.121
Such public ignorance clearly diminishes the accountability of the FDA. Even if all consumers would approve
of FDA's current regulatory stance if fully informed, they cannot express this approval until they are armed
with the relevant facts. Information, or a lack thereof, is an essential factor in determining the extent to
which citizens can hold government agencies accountable for their regulatory actions. To the extent that the
government actors should be accountable to the public in a democracy, consumers should have information
about the products that they are consuming daily. The FDA's own data indicate that the market is not
providing customers with that information in the absence of mandatory labeling, and thus that the FDA is
regulating in a vacuum.
The FDA's focus group ndings conrm that citizens do expect to be provided with such information about
120Interestingly, those who argue for relaxed labeling standards and federal regulatory oversight with regard to nutritional
claims on food packaging are likely to be the same advocates who would argue that manufacturers and other food producers
should not be required to label foods containing genetically modied food products. Nevertheless, the basic argument for
consumer disclosure in both cases is very similar: Consumers should be allowed to have the most information that will allow
them to make informed consumer choices without the interference of government agencies paternalistically deciding how they
well they will be able to interpret those labels.
121Consumer Focus Groups, supra note 5 at 6.
21the application of biotechnology to foods on the market, and that the absence of such information on the
market violates their sense of liberty and fairness. Interestingly, when told of the extent to which biotechnol-
ogy has already aected the food supply, the primary reaction of the study participants was not immediate
concern about the health impacts that the unknowing consumption of such food may have had on their
health.122 Instead their primary reaction was \outrage that such a change in the food supply could happen
without them knowing about it."123 Participants also related being \disturbed by the lack of public infor-
mation and public input to a major development in the quality of their food supply."124
Participants' suspicion of this technology also seems to be linked to a fear that the new technology threatened
their personal autonomy. Some of the participants indicated that they were being used as \guinea pigs."125
Even more disconcerting is the fact that consumers who expressed acceptance of agricultural biotechnology
often also expressed a degree of \technological fatalism, the belief that ordinary people can't have much
inuence over the spread of new technologies."126 Such \technological fatalism," is certainly not consistent
with democratic ideals. If consumers feel fatalistic about the entrance of biotechnology into the food supply,
it logically follows that they also feel that they have no power to hold government agencies responsible for
regulation of these foods.
3.
Market based arguments for labeling
In addition to these liberty and democracy based arguments, mandatory labeling of genetically engineered





126Consumer Focus Groups, supra note 5 at 3.
22against labeling bioengineered foods might be that consumers can always get information about the prod-
ucts they purchase if they demand it. Under this line of reasoning, consumers are not being provided with
information about whether their food is genetically modied because they are unwilling to pay the cost of
receiving that information. Furthermore, this argument would posit that a labeling requirement would only
force ineciencies into the marketplace by forcing consumers to pay for the provision of information they
would not otherwise demand.127
However, there are good reasons to believe that there are heightened risks of market failure in the market
for information.128 Information is often a \public good" in which all individuals would benet from the
provision of information, but once this information has been gathered the rst time, the transaction costs
of discovering the results of the rst gathering are extremely low.129 Because the information will be widely
available once one person takes the time to gather it, later comers can eectively \capture the benets of
information without having to pay for its production."130 Accordingly, each individual has an incentive to
try to free ride on the eorts of others to gather the information, and ultimately the optimal amount of in-
formation is not generated.131 Although all consumers may have some interest in getting information about
whether or not the products they are purchasing contain genetically modied ingredients, each individual
consumer also has an incentive to free ride on the eorts of others. Moreover, the information gathering costs
for any individual consumer would be cost and time prohibitive in this case, especially since most genetically
engineered foods are found as ingredients in processed foods.132 Moreover, consumers are not even aware of
the necessity of gathering this information because they are not aware that these foods have already entered
127Interestingly, this argument has not been advanced by agricultural biotechnology proponents.
128Sunstein, Informing America: Risk Disclosure and the First Amendment, supra note 117, at 655.
129Id. at 656.
130Id.
131Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, supra note117, at 656.
132Just consider the transaction costs that would be expended in attempting to research every single food product purchases
to determine if any of these products contained genetically engineered products. Such a search would almost certainly prove
fruitless. Greenpeace has put a tentative listing of foods that contain genetically engineered foods on the web available at
<<http://www.truefoodnow.org/shoppinglist.html>>. However, this list is far from exhaustive, its existence is not well known,
and the reliability of the list cannot be determined in the absence of large scale testing.
23the marketplace.
Also, manufacturers of both hazardous and unhazardous products may have special incentives to keep infor-
mation about product safety o the market because the resulting public debate \over the extent of danger
may decrease total purchases of the product, rather than help any particularly manufacturer to obtain greater
sales."133 In this case, the debate over the extent of the danger of GM foods may simply decrease total pur-
chases of particular foods that commonly contain GM foods rather than increasing sales of a particular brand.
Accordingly, manufacturers may determine that would have nothing to gain from providing consumers with
information about potential hazards, or factors that the public may perceive as public hazards.
The food market presents a classic example of \information asymmetry" in which consumers have virtually
no information about products they purchase unless such information is provided by the food producers.
Sunstein notes that such situations commonly create the possibility of a
`
lemons' problem in which dangerous products drive safe ones out of the market. Imagine, for
example, that producers know which products are safe but that consumers cannot tell. Safe products
may not be able to compete if they sell for a higher price than dangerous ones if safe products are
more expensive to produce and if consumers are unable to tell the dierence. In that case, the
fact that sellers have information, while buyers do not, will ensure that `lemons'|here dangerous
products|will dominate the market.134
In fact, genetically engineered foods do not actually have to be dangerous in order for this \lemons eect"
to apply. In the case of genetically engineered foods, producers often are eminently aware that some of
their products or ingredients have been produced through genetic engineering techniques, and consumers are
largely unaware of this information. Moreover, manufacturers (probably correctly) assume that consumers
are likely to view genetically modied foods with an increased dose of suspicion, and that genetically modied
products may be cheaper or more convenient for producers to produce. Under these constraints, it is hardly
surprising that manufacturers have insucient independent incentives to provide this information absent
133Sunstein, Informing America, supra note 117, at 656.
24government intervention. After all, why should manufacturers provide information to consumers when that
information is only likely to damage the total market for the product, and when consumers otherwise cannot
tell the dierence between genetically engineered and non-engineered products? In fact, the provision of such
information would almost surely require manufacturers to spend a great deal of money in eorts to convince
consumers of the merits of the new technology, whereas withholding this information costs the producers
nothing at all.
Moreover, manufacturers and food producers have a particular disincentive to acquiesce to labeling because
such a disclosure system might compel a complete overhaul of the current food processing system. Under
the current food production system, many genetically engineered products and non-engineered products are
routinely mixed together. 135 A labeling regime would require food manufacturers to either (1) create a
system for segregating bioengineered foods from non-bioengineered foods|which would inevitably involve
some considerable infrastructure investment costs136; or (2) risk consumer disinterest or suspicion of foods
labeled \may contain genetically modied/bioengineered foods."137
Given these factors, it is easy to see why manufacturers would have insucient incentives to provide this in-
formation on the market|the end result being that consumers are buying genetically modied foods without
realizing it.138 FDA's current stand against mandatory labeling works to the advantage farmers and other
food producers. Because producers do not need to segregate genetically engineered products from other
products, \farmers are free to produce either variety or some combination thereof" without the pressure of
predicting or inuencing consumer preferences for either variety.139
Nevertheless, while the current system of non-labeling may benet farmers and other producers concerned
135Matthew Franken, Comment, Fear of Frankenfoods: A Better Labeling Standard for Genetically Modied Foods, 1 Minn.
Intell. Prop. Rev. 153, 170 (2000). See infra, section IIID.
136See infra section IIID.
137\May contain" labels are disfavored by some food producers because they \suggest the food industry doesn't know what's
going into their products, and we don't think that's helpful." Food Chemical News, July 13, 1998, available at 1998 WL
10981464.
138See supra section IIC.
139Franken, supra note 2 at 169.
25about their ability to garner consumer acceptance of bioengineered foods, it is doubtful whether those dy-
namics contribute to the functioning of an ecient marketplace. Certainly accurate consumer information
about products is a key assumption of the theory of ecient markets. A market in which consumers are not
permitted to express their preferences (even if producers nd such preferences irrational or inconvenient)
does not conform with the traditional model of an ecient market.
Modern consumers have demonstrated saaviness to the importance of their purchasing decisions on the
biotech industry. The FDA consumer focus group study found that \[m]any participants recognized sym-
bolic value in choosing not to buy products of biotechnology. They felt mere disclosure labeling gave them an
opportunity to register their view about the wisdom of food biotechnology...They said they wanted to `send
a message' to the company."140 Although this \message" is probably not one that many biotech companies
would be happy to receive, it is a message that at least some consumers wish to send through purchasing
decisions. Of course, this may not be a \rational" way to make food purchasing decisions, but of course,
the marketplace allows consumers to express all sorts of irrational preferences. Moreover, the government
generally does not protect companies from consumer preferences.
The current lack of consumer awareness about the prevalence of genetically engineered foods creates a dan-
gerous vacuum of public ignorance, raising risks of unbridled \interest group maneuvering."141 Because
consumers are largely ignorant of the introduction of biotech foods into their diets, they are in no position
to lobby either the Congress or the FDA for regulatory action. This vacuum leaves the biotech industry
free to lobby all government actors for favorable treatment with relatively public oversight. 142 This state
of public ignorance and lack of public FDA accountability creates increased risks of inappropriate biotech
industry inuence over FDA policymakers.
140Consumer Focus Groups, supra note 5 at 5.
141Sunstein, Informing America, supra note 117, at 660.
142Sunstein, Informing America, supra note 117, at 660. Sunstein argues that such a scenario is \poorly suited to democrati-
cally controlled risk reduction. It is highly likely that Congress will end up pleasing the relevant groups with a mechanism that
helps the most powerful and well-organized lobbyists." Id.
26III.
Government and Other Aligned Parties' Responses to Demands for
Labeling
A.
Mandatory labeling is not statutorily compelled|genetic engineering is not a
material fact.
As outlined in Section IE, the government's rst line response to labeling arguments is that information
about genetic engineering is not material. Although the FDA has not explicitly stated that it does not
have the statutory authority to mandate labeling of all genetically engineered foods, its policy rests on the
assumption that labeling is not statutorily required. FDA has argued that it is only authorized to require
labeling regarding \information about the attributes of the food itself,"143 implying that it has no authority
to require labeling information about a particular food process.
B.
The Current Government Policy is Based on Science.
From its inception, the FDA and other government actors have insistently defended the current biotechnol-
ogy regulations as \science-based."144 For instance, in announcing the most recent modications in FDA's
14358 Fed. Reg. 25837, at 25838.
144David A. Kessler, et al., The Safety of Foods Developed by Biotechnology, 256 Science 1747 at 1832. See also, Maryanski
Statement, supra note 34 at 3. See also, Joseph A. Levitt's, FDA Director of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition,
public forum's statement that \we believe that our policies and processes in this area are well-grounded in science, and that
we have an excellent track record in applying our policy." Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond, supra note 22 at 18;
27policy, the White House released a press statement arming that \[t]he Administration's actions today will
ensure that science remains the cornerstone of the nation's regulatory system"145 and noting the \federal
government's condence in its independent, science-based regulatory approach to agricultural biotechnol-
ogy"146 Supporters of the FDA policy argue that it reects a \scientic consensus that the risks associated
with recombinant organisms, and with products derived from them, are fundamentally the same as for
non-recombinant products."147 With respect to labeling, the FDA has suggested that it would not require
labeling unless presented with evidence that \any of the bioengineered foods already on the market have
adverse health eects."148 Thus, the FDA essentially argues that the agency's policy is \science based"
because no adverse health eects have yet been proven. The government relies on the opinions of scientists
such as Robert McKinney, director of the safety division at the National Institutes of Health, who has stated,
\I don't see any problems at all for genetically modied plants in terms of human health. Researchers are
being asked to prove negatives."149
C.
Critics are motivated by political not scientic considerations.
As a corollary to the \science" defense of FDA's current non-labeling policy, biotech supporters often accuse
those expressing apprehension about the risks of agricultural biotechnology of possessing \hidden political
statement of Maryanski at the same forum stating \Our policies are always based on the best science that is available" Id. at
26.
145Press Release, White House, Clinton Administration Agencies Announce Food and Agricultural Biotechnology Ini-
tiatives: Strengthening Science-Based Regulation and Consumer Access to Information (May 3, 2000), available at
<http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/whbio53.html>.
146Id.
147Henry I. Miller, A Rational Approach to Labeling Biotech-Derived Foods, 284 Science 1471 (May 28, 1999), available at
<http://www.sciencemag.org>.
14866 Fed. Reg. at 4839.
149Declan Butler & Tony Reichhardt, Long-term Eect of GM Crops Serves up Food for Thought, 398 Nature 651, 651 (April
22, 1999).
28agendas"150 or playing on unscientic fears. For instance, one commentator has warned that the more cau-
tious regulatory approach in Europe and Asia amounted to a system in which \regulators have permitted
politics, public misapprehensions, and blandishments of anti-technology activists, and nescience to dictate
policy."151 Similarly, Gary Kushner, counsel to the Grocery Manufacturers of America, characterized misgiv-
ings about biotechnology as \unsubstantiated and unscientic thinking" and further warned that \activists
with a political agenda...[might] kill the promise of biotech foods."152 Legal arguments against mandatory
labeling often take the same tack, characterizing the consumer's right to know arguments are \unscien-
tic."153 David Schmidt of the International Food Information Council has argued against a mandatory
labeling policy by arguing, \Precious food-label real estate should be reserved for vital health and safety
information, not for social statements."154
At least one biotech supporter has argued that calls for labeling are actually part of a conspiracy to get rid
of the technology altogether. Referring to the \intentions and actions of ideological opponents of the new
biotechnology," Henry I. Miller argues that
[L]abeling raises costs, which discourages producers and consumers and destroys markets for new
products, so for those wishing to block the commercialization of biotech products, forcing an in-
creasing costs is an eective strategy. Regulatory stringency is also an unmistakable signal to the
public that there is something fundamentally dierent and worrisome about biotech foods. Anti-
biotechnology activists argue that we need regulation because consumers are apprehensive, and then,
when consumers become apprehensive because the products are stringently regulated, these activists
say we need more regulation to assuage consumers' concerns...Heavy involvement by government,
no matter how well intended, inevitably sends the wrong signals.155
150Andrew Pollack, Critics of Biotechnology Are Called Imperialists, N.Y. Times, February 4, 2001, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/04/weekinreview/04POLL.html>. (Ingo Potrykus, a scientist who helped to create the
golden rice strain, accuses anti-biotech advocates of being motivated solely by a hatred of science, stating \It is not so much
concern about the environment, or the health of the consumer, or help for the poor and disadvantaged. It is a radical ght
against a technology and for political success.")
151Miller, supra note 147
152Sharon Schmickle, Genetic Engineering of Foodstus Sows Debate over Labeling, Star-Tribune Newspaper of the Twin
Cities, Oct. 18, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7511348. Of course, the irony of this statement is that an \activist with a political
agenda" is arguing that \activists with political agendas" should not inuence the biotechnology debate.
153Frederick H. Degnan, The Food Label and the Right to Know, 52 Food & Drug L.J. 49, 57 (1997).
154Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond, supra note 22 at 273.
29Thus, he characterizes calls for labeling as merely disguised attempts to spread public fear, and ultimately
destroy the biotech industry.
D.
Segregation required by mandatory labeling would be both infeasible and too
costly.
On a practical level, the FDA and other biotech supporters often argue that a mandatory labeling policy
would require extremely expensive, inecient, and infeasible segregation system to separate genetically engi-
neered foods from traditionally derived foods. The FDA has raised questions about the \practical diculties
and economic impact" of a labeling requirement.156 Segregation of genetically engineered foods will probably
create the most diculties in the case of corn and other products handled in bulk.157 For instance, \there
are ten points of the trip from farm to ship at which dierent types of soyabeans [sic] are deliberately mixed
to improve their quality."158 Some have argued that a segregation system for soybeans and maize could
increase price of the non engineered categories of such foods by as much as 100%.159 Moreover, identity
testing would be required to ensure that the foods had been eectively separated, and such testing could
add as much as 30% to the nal food product.160 Many argue that consumers would be unwilling to bear
the burden of such added costs.161
VI.
15658 Fed. Reg. 25837, 25840 (1993), cited in Whittaker, supra note 13 at 1240.
157Food for Thought, Economist, July 17, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7363490.
158Food for Thought, Economist, July 17, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7363490.
159Id.
160Sticky Labels, Economist, April 29, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7362891.
161Sticky Labels, Economist, April 29, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7362891.
30Responses to the government argument
The FDA arguments against labeling center are founded on the assumption that neither the statute nor
the relevant science compel labeling. However, the regulatory framework set out in the 1992 policy is not
the only possible interpretation of the FDA's authority, and the scientic basis for the FDA's conclusions
was not unassailable. Given this statutory exibility and scientic uncertainty, the FDA had a great deal
of discretion in making its policy determinations, and political considerations inuenced the shape of the
eventual policy.
A.
Statutory analysis does not compel the FDA's conclusions regarding bioengi-
neering.
1. Pre-market Notice
FDA labeling policy is based on a conclusion drawn very early in the regulatory process that genetically
engineered foods are essentially the same as other, traditionally derived, foods. However, since the labeling
policy was developed, the agency has recognized the increased risks that the application of biotechnology to
foods may raise. Most notably, the recently proposed pre-marketing notice represents FDA recognition that
these foods do merit additional regulatory requirements. The FDA explicitly recognized, \FDA expects that
these techniques are likely to be utilized to an increasingly greater extent by plant breeders and that the
products of this technology are likely in some cases to present more complex safety and regulatory issues than
seen to date."162 In addition, the FDA acknowledged that \there is a greater potential for foods developed
16266 Fed. Reg. at 4709.
31using rDNA technology to contain substances that are food additives" under the act.163 Thus, although the
FDA reiterated its view that \transferred genetic material can be presumed to be GRAS,"164 the agency
ultimately conceded that this new technology was more likely to pose heightened of safety and regulatory
concerns. FDA also stated that agricultural biotechnology processes may \lead to unintended changes in
foods that raise adulteration or misbranding questions,"165 and that the application of rDNA technology
may also increase the risk of allergenicity.166
This acknowledgement of the increased likelihood of particular risks with the application of agricultural
biotechnology presents a striking contrast to the FDA's 1992 insistence that bioengineered foods and tra-
ditionally derived foods could be regulated under the exact same regulatory structure. By requiring pre-
marketing notice of genetically engineered foods, the FDA implicitly acknowledged that the regulatory
structure needed to respond to the unique concerns posed by the genetic engineering of foods. This soft-
ening of the FDA's position indicates that the FDA is, at least on some level, recognizing that the 1992
pronouncement about genetically engineered foods had been somewhat premature, or at least no longer
completely applicable.
Despite this acknowledgment of the need for increased regulatory scrutiny of genetically engineered foods, the
FDA continued to argue that these regulations did not indicate that genetically engineered foods necessarily
had any dierent \legal status" than traditionally derived foods. Instead the FDA argued:
16366 Fed. Reg. at 4709.
16466 Fed. Reg. at 4709.
16566 Fed. Reg. at 4710.
166The agency noted an \increased potential for introducing an allergen into a food developed using rDNA technology" or
using rDNA technology to inadvertently create plants that express proteins at higher concentrations such that a protein that
is normally safe for consumption could create allergenic aects at higher doses. 66 Fed. Reg. at 4709
32[W]hether there is a change in the legal status of a food resulting from a particular rDNA modi-
cation depends almost entirely on the nature of the modication, and that not every modication
accomplished with rDNA techniques will alter the legal status of the food. In other words, many
modications will result in a food that does not contain an unapproved food additive, does not
contain an unexpected allergen, and does not dier signicantly in its composition compared with
its traditional counterpart or otherwise require special labeling. For this reason, FDA is neither
proposing to require premarket approval for all foods developed using rDNA technology nor is the
agency proposing an across-the-board requirement that all such foods require special labeling."167
Thus, the FDA went to great pains to indicate that these new regulations did not indicate a special \legal
status" for genetically engineered products. Nevertheless, the new regulations did amount to an acknowledge-
ment that particular risks were more likely to be raised by genetically engineered foods, and did undeniably
create new requirements for genetically engineered foods that do not exist for traditionally modied foods.
The FDA explicitly stated that it believes that bioengineered foods \are appropriately made subject to
greater FDA scrutiny by FDA in the form of enhanced agency awareness of all such foods intended for com-
mercial distribution. This increased agency awareness will ensure that at every stage of this continuously
evolving technology, all market entry decisions about new bioengineered foods...are made consistently and
in full compliance with the law."168 In the end, it is not surprising that FDA was nally forced to back away
from its 1992 conclusions that the end products of genetically engineered foods were to be regulated exactly
the same as traditionally derived food products. After all, this determination was keyed on assumptions
about the technology that had been made while the technology was hardly in its infancy.
There are two noteworthy aspects to this shift in FDA policy. First, the FDA has at least implicitly ac-
knowledged that it is not appropriate to subject traditionally derived foods and genetically engineered foods
to exactly the same regulatory requirements|that genetic engineering poses particular kinds of risks that
merit increased regulatory scrutiny. Second, the FDA acknowledged that these increased or dierent risks
posed by genetic engineering merit an information-based remedy in order to facilitate monitoring.
16866 Fed. Reg. at 4712.
33These acknowledgements notwithstanding, the FDA remains committed to its 1992 labeling policy. Inter-
estingly, the FDA seems to argue that it is proper for the food industry to be required to provide the agency
with detailed information about the particular genetic engineering process applied to the food, but that
information about food processing need not be provided to consumers. Ultimately, this labeling contro-
versy is not so much about whether there are increased risks with genetically engineered foods; the FDA
has already acknowledged those increased risks. Rather, the struggle over labeling is fundamentally about
whether consumers should be allowed to control their exposure to these risks, and make purchasing decisions
informed by this information. In essence, the FDA seems to be arguing that that genetic engineering merits
\enhanced agency awareness" but not enhanced consumer awareness. Moreover, the agency's stance seems
premised on the argument that it has an interest in regulating the entry of these foods into the marketplace,
but that consumers themselves do not have a sucient interest in making purchasing decisions equipped
with information that that would allow them to inuence the success of these foods in the marketplace.
2. GRAS determination
In fact, although the FDA was careful to state that the new regulations would not aect the \legal status" of
such foods (presumably the legal assumption that genetically engineered products were GRAS) the change in
regulatory posture does provide reason to question precisely that decision to presume genetically engineered
foods to be GRAS. In the 1992 document, FDA's decisions (1) not to require labeling, (2) not to require
premarket notication, and (3) to presume genetic material transferred during genetic engineering to be
GRAS were all based on a basic assumption that genetically modied foods could be regulated exactly the
same as other \foods derived from new plant varieties." Thus, the FDA argued against labeling genetically
engineered foods because the it does not require special labeling of traditionally-derived foods. Similarly,
there was no need for premarket notication because no such notication is required for foods derived from
34traditional breeding techniques.
Arguable, the FDA might have argued that the genetically engineered foods did not need to be exam-
ined under the additive/GRAS regulatory structure at all, since those provisions had never been applied to
plants derived from traditional breeding techniques. In fact an internal FDA document reveals that at least
some FDA actors realized that the decision to regulate genetically engineered foods under the food addi-
tive/GRAS provisions was \dicult to reconcile with not regulating conventionally-altered whole foods in
food additive/GRAS category."169 Nevertheless, the FDA made a decision to regulate genetically engineered
foods under the food additive/GRAS structure, partly to \assure safety and satisfy the public that it is being
protected."170 However, as in the case of premarket notice, the regulations concerning additive/GRAS deter-
minations deviated from standard practice for GRAS determinations. The decision that transferred genetic
material could be presumed to be GRAS was a policy judgment call made very early in the development of
the technology, and not based on any particular statutory basis, or even on a conventional understanding of
what would be \generally recognized as safe."
In fact, analysis of the regulations concerning the GRAS exception reveals that genetically engineered mate-
rial would probably not be considered GRAS under the FDA's own regulations. In order for a food to qualify
as GRAS, the food must be generally recognized as safe \based on the views of experts qualied by scientic
training and experience to evaluate the safety of substances directly or indirectly added to food...[based
on] either (1) scientic procedures, or (2) in the case of a substance used in food prior to January 1, 1958,
through experience based on common use in food."171 The FDA has argued that these two bases for GRAS
must be kept distinct arguing, \section 201(s) of the act makes a clear distinction between qualifying for the
GRAS exemption through scientic procedures and qualifying for the GRAS exemption through common
169FDA Regulation of Food Products Derived from Genetically-Altered Plants, 2 , available at
<http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>.
170FDA Regulation of Food Products Derived from Genetically-Altered Plants, 1, available at
<http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>.
17121 C.F.R. x 170.30(a).
35use in food."172
Nevertheless, FDA has never indicated on which of these bases it was declaring transferred genetic material
to be GRAS. In fact, these substances would not meet the requirements of either of these provisions. In
order to meet the common use criteria, the GRAS determination \shall be based solely on food use of the
substance prior to January 1, 1958."173 Transfer of moth genes or other genes from bacteria in soil (Bt)
(both genes transferred to create genetically engineered products) were not commonly used in food prior to
January 1, 1958. Moreover, the statute specically states, \A food ingredient of natural biological origin that
has been widely consumed for its nutrient properties in the United States prior to January 1, 1958, without
known detrimental eects, which is subject only to conventional processing as practiced prior to January 1,
1958" [italics added]174 will qualify as GRAS. Thus, the statute makes it clear that the processing of the
food, as well as the actual existence of the substance in food, are key to the GRAS determination. Even for
substances that did exist in foods commonly consumed before 1958, the common use exception would not
apply when those foods are added through genetic engineering techniques since those techniques were not
in use until well after 1958. In fact, the FDA has made itself very clear on this point, stating \it is the use
of a substance, rather than the substance itself, that is eligible for the GRAS exemption." [italics added]175
Thus, in order for food substances to qualify under the GRAS exception, the technique used to add that
particular substance must also qualify as GRAS.
Nor do substances added through genetic engineering techniques qualify under the scientic procedures re-
quirements for GRAS status. The decision to allow food producers to self-arm the GRAS status of the
products under a \decision tree" analysis was clearly not consistent with \emerging FDA legal interpreta-
tions" of GRAS requirements, particularly the \`publication' requirement."176 In order to be deemed GRAS
17262 Fed. Reg. at 18950.
17321 C.F.R. x 170.30(c)(1)
17421. C.F.R. x 170.30(d)
17562 Fed. Reg. at 18950.
176FDA Regulation of Food Products Derived from Genetically-Altered Plants, 2 available at
36based upon the scientic procedures criterion, the manufacturer must show \the same quantity and quality
of scientic evidence as is required to obtain approval of a food additive regulation of the ingredient. Gen-
eral recognition of safety through scientic procedures shall ordinarily be based upon published studies."177
Moreover, under traditional GRAS jurisprudence, the substance must be \'generally recognized' by qualied
experts as having been scientically shown to be safe. To fall within this exception, the substance must
be \generally recognized as safe under the conditions of its intended use. The burden of proving general
recognition of safe use is placed on the proponent of the food substance in question." [italics in original]178
Moreover, it is not enough for the plainti to show that there is no evidence proving the added substance to
be unsafe, rather, the food manufacturer has a burden to proof that the substance is \generally recognized
by experts as safe based on scientic evidence." [italics in original]179 The FDA has stated that, \an ongoing
scientic discussion or controversy about safety concerns raised by available data would make it dicult to
provide a basis for expert consensus about the safety of a substance for its intended use."180
Nevertheless, genetically modied foods have been allowed to circumvent these requirements. Although
current regulations do allow manufacturers to self-arm GRAS status, the FDA has argued that it may
challenge such armations \if the information provided in the notice: 1) does not adequately establish
technical evidence of safety; 2) is not generally available; 3) does not convince the agency that there is the
requisite expert consensus about the safety of the substance for its intended use; or 4) is so poorly presented
that the basis for the GRAS determination is not clear."181
These regulations make it clear that GRAS was always intended to be a very limited exception to the food
additive requirements and that the standard was to be extremely strict. Although the FDA insists that
<http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>.
17721 C.F.R. x 170.30(b).
178United States v. An Article of Food, 752 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1985), cited in Peter Baron Hutt & Richard A. Merill ,
Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials, 333 (1991).
179Id.
18062 Fed. Reg. 18938 at 18949.
181Substances Generally Recognized as Safe; Proposed Rule, 62 FR 18,938 at 18950 (Apr. 17, 1997), cited in Steinborn &
Todd, The End of Paternalism: A New Approach to Food Labeling, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 401, 408 (1999).
37genetically engineered foods can be presumed GRAS, if actually analyzed under the relevant regulatory
framework, these foods would not meet the GRAS requirements. In creating a \decision tree approach"
the FDA explicitly lowered the bar for manufacturers adding foods through genetic engineering processes.
Producers of genetically engineered foods are (1) not required to provide published articles establishing the
safety of the genetic modications used; (2) not required to armatively establish the safety of those foods;
and (3) are not required to demonstrate an expert consensus of safety.
The FDA may argue that genetic engineering should not be subjected to this GRAS analysis because, like
plant breeding, these methods are \applied in the earliest stages of development of new plant varieties and
are not processes applied to nished food."182 However, the GRAS common use provisions focus on whether
the use of the food, including the food processing method, was in place before 1958, not on the point of
application of the processing method. Plant breeding clearly was in use before 1958, and genetic engineering
clearly was not. The plant breeding analogy simply makes no sense in the context of the GRAS analysis
because the GRAS exception was clearly meant to be a very limited exception for added substances that
truly were generally recognized as safe. A presumption that any added substance is GRAS is out of sync
with this intention. Given this disconnect between the FDA's GRAS analysis in the biotechnology context
and in all other food additive contexts, Goldberg for Environmental Defense Fund has observed that the
policy \appears to do more to protect the biotechnology industry than to protect consumers...FDA's policy
gives manufacturers who use genetic engineering to add substances to food considerably more discretion than
manufacturers who use other technologies to add substances to food."183
Although the FDA employs the \food additive" and \GRAS" language in describing its regulations of geneti-
18258 Fed. Reg. 25837 at 25839.
183Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond, supra note 22 at 94.
38cally modied foods, it is at least arguable that these terms have dierent meanings in the genetic engineering
context. FDA's determination to presume genetically added materially to be GRAS is inconsistent with the
heavy burden FDA usually places on food producers to prove that particular additives t under the GRAS
exception. Moreover, the FDA's explicit acknowledgment that it will only regulate added genetic material
\in cases where safety questions exist sucient to warrant formal premarket review...to ensure public health
protection"184 is not really consistent with the other food additive regulations that require the producer to
\demonstrate to a reasonable certainty that no harm will result form the intended use of the additive."185
In short, although FDA's claims to be regulating genetically engineered foods and other food substances in
exactly the same way, it is clear that the regulatory framework applied to genetically engineered foods and
other foods are extremely dierent.
The current FDA policy regarding the regulation of genetically added material creates anomalous results
and stretches the statutory scheme. In order to reach the determination that materials inserted into plants
are \generally recognized as safe," the FDA denes these materials extremely broadly as simply \nucleic
acids" which it argued \are present in the cells of every living organism, including every plant and animal
used for food by humans or animals, and do not raise a safety concern as a component of food."186 Of
course, by dening genetically added material generally as nucleic acids, rather than more specically by
the types of the genetic materially added in each instance, the FDA framed the issue in extremely general
terms, and obscured the underlying, very real, safety issues raised by this technology. FDA Commissioner
Henney stated \adding an extra bit of DNA does not raise any food safety issues."187 Alternatively, the
FDA could have based its regulation of these substances more generally in the type and function of the
18457 Fed. Reg. at 22990.
18557 Fed. Reg. at 22988.
18657 Fed. Reg. at 22990.
187Larry Thompson, Are Bioengineered Foods Safe? available at <http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/dms/fdbioeng.html>.
39particular genetic material being added|for instance, dening the additive in Bt corn as genetic material
from a bacteria found in soil known to have pesticidal eects. After all, the addition of any food additive
would involve the addition of \an extra bit of DNA" since all substances are composed of DNA. The FDA's
position simply obscures the actual public concern. This extremely selective interpretation of the statute
and the underlying technology strongly suggests that FDA determined its regulatory stance towards these
materials rst, and then decided how t it could most conveniently t those conclusions into the existing
statutory and regulatory structure.
The very fact that FDA has created special GRAS determination standards for genetically engineered foods
directly undercuts the that agency assertion that \a substance that would be a food additive if it were added
during traditional food manufacture is also treated as a food additive if it is introduced into food through
genetic modication of a food crop."188 In fact, before the release of the 1992 policy, the Head of the FDA's
Biological and Organic Chemistry Section, Dr. Mitchell Smith argued the policy \turns the conventional
connotation of food additive on its head"189 [italics in original] and that \just because the agency failed to
evaluate `new substances' introduced by conventional breeding gives it no reason to continue to do so now
with new biotechnology."190
3. Comparison with Irradiation Labeling Policy
FDA's labeling policy for irradiated foods demonstrates the extent to which the exact the same regulatory
framework can be interpreted to compel labeling in extremely similar circumstances. FDA's stance against
188Mayanski Statement, supra note 34 at 3. See also Memorandum from Louis J. Pribyl, \Biotechnology Draft Document,
2/27/92." (March 6, 1992), available at <http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>. (\Why should companies conduct tests
as described in the ow charts [in the 1992 policy] if there are no dierences between traditional foods and those produced by
modern technology." Internal FDA documents charged that the 1992 policy was \inconsistent, in that it says (implies) that
there are no dierences between traditional breeding and recombinant [breeding], yet consultations, and remarket approvals
are being bantered around, when they have not been used for foods before. In fact the FDA is making a distinction, so why
pretend otherwise. [sic]")
189Memorandum from Dr. Mitchell Smith, Head, Biological and Organic Chemistry Section, to Dr. James Maryanski,
Biotechnology Coordinator, \Comments on Draft Federal Register Notice on Food Biotechnology, Dec, 12, 1991 draft." (Jan.
8, 1992), available at <http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>.
190Id.
40mandatory labeling of genetically engineered foods is founded on the argument that information about
genetically engineering is not \material" for purposes of section 201(n) of the act.191 Although the FDA
acknowledged the many comments it received requesting mandatory labeling,192 the agency has at least
implied that it will not consider such information material unless it becomes aware of data indicating that
\bioengineered foods already on the market have adverse health eects."193 At least one FDA ocial
disputed this conclusion. Dr. Smith, Head of the FDA's Biological and Organic Chemistry Section argued,
\[i]t is immaterial that the FDA doesn't believe methods of genetic modications are material information
important to consumers if regulations do indeed indicate that the former will be a material fact when
consumers view such information as important."194 Although Dr Smith was a scientist, and not a lawyer,
his analysis was consistent with FDA's previous interpretation of the materiality standard in the irradiation
context.
The FDA's current insistence on scientic evidence of an adverse health eect as the primary justication for
labeling is not consistent with FDA's previous analysis of labeling and materiality issues. In the irradiation
context the FDA explicitly stated that safety considerations were not the only legitimate basis for a labeling
requirement.195 Rather, the agency based its irradiation labeling requirements on a misbranding rationale
rather than a safety or health rationale.196 The agency stated that the act granted it authority to require
labeling even in the absence of safety concerns under section 403(a), 201(n), and 409 of the act,197 specically
noting that \[s]ection 409(c)(3)(B) of the act prohibits the approval of a food additive if a fair evaluation of
191Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengi-




19551 Fed. Reg. at 13388 (\The agency emphasizes, however, that the labeling requirement is not based on any concern about
the safety of the uses of radiation...")
19651 Fed. Reg. at 13389 (\The retail label requirements of existing 21 C.F.R. part 179 were based on misbranding consider-
ations and not on food safety or health considerations...")
19751 Fed. Reg. at 13388
41the data before the Secretary `shows that the proposed use of the additive would promote deception of the
consumer in violation of this Act or would otherwise result in adulteration or in misbranding of food within
the meaning of the Act"'198 The potential for consumer deception|not just potential health harms|was
the focus of misbranding analysis.
Because the FDA's focus was on misbranding and consumer deception, the materiality analysis was explicitly
consumer-centered. The analysis considered \whether the changes brought about by the safe use of irradi-
ation are material facts in light of the representations made, including the failure to reveal material facts,
about such foods. Irradiation may not change the food visually so that in the absence of a statement that a
food has been irradiated, the implied representation to consumers is that the food has not been processed."
[emphasis added]199 The FDA's misbranding analysis focused on what assumptions consumers would make
about their food based on the presence or absence of a label. Moreover, the FDA explicitly considered
consumer interest in information a key factor in determining materiality. The agency stated that materiality
\depends not on the abstract worth of the information but on whether consumers view such information as
important and whether the omission of label information may mislead a consumer." [emphasis added]200 The
FDA interpreted the many comments it received requesting labeling as evidence of the \signicance placed
on such labeling by consumers."201 This deference to consumer interests and rejection of an \abstract worth
of information" standard in determining materiality is in direct contrast to the FDA's current stance toward
labeling requirements of biotechnology wherein consumer interest is deemed essentially irrelevant absent
evidence of \adverse health eects."202
Moreover, the FDA noted that classication of irradiation as a food process was not relevant for the ma-
19851 Fed. Reg. at 13388.
19951 Fed. Reg. at 13388.
20051 Fed. Reg. 13376, 13388.
201Id.
20266 Fed. Reg. at 4840.
42teriality determination.203 Instead, the FDA noted that it has \historically required the disclosure of a
food processing agent whenever it is material"204 and cited specic precedents for requiring labeling of food
processes. For instance, the labels of ours must indicate \bleached" or \bromated" in if those processes had
been applied,205 juices made from concentrate must be labeled as such,206 and that pasteurized orange juice
must also bear special labeling.207 Moreover, other non-technological processing techniques must also be
disclosed: \[f]oods made in semblance of a traditional food must disclose the processing dierence. Potato
chips made from dehydrated potatoes, onion rings made from minced onions, and sh sticks made from
minced sh are all required to disclose these material dierences in processing."208 In sharp contrast to the
1992 policy's insistence that the nal food product rather than the processing method is the proper focus of
materiality,209 these examples demonstrate that the materiality inquiry historically has encompassed both
process and nal food product.
FDA has a long history of requiring information about the processing of food products to appear on the food
label.210 If the use of minced rather than whole onions in the making of onion rings constitutes a material
fact that must be revealed on a food label, then it certainly seems that the use of bioengineering in a tomato
sold fresh or as a part of tomato paste is also a material fact that ought to be revealed on a label. It would
be hard to articulate a principled distinction under which the mincing of onions would be material, while
the addition of genetic material intended to have pesticidal eects would not be material. The examples
of material processes in document demonstrate consumer expectations are the key factor in any materiality
20351 Fed. Reg. at 13389 (\Nor is there any statutory provision that exempts processes from being declared on a food label
(49 Fed. Reg. 5718) and the agency must examine whether the failure to declare such processing is misleading to consumers. In
this context it is not relevant whether irradiation is considered a process in determining whether retail labeling is appropriate.")
20451 Fed. Reg. at 13388.
20551 Fed. Reg. at 13388 citing 21 C.F.R. x 137.205.
20651 Fed. Reg. at 13388 citing 21 C.F.R. x 146.145.
207Id., citing 21 C.F.R. x 146.140.
20851 Fed. Reg. 13376, 13388.
20957 Fed. Reg. at 22984-5 (\the key factors in reviewing safety concerns should be the characteristics of the food product,
rather than the fact that the new methods are used.")
210These examples directly refute Degnan's contention that the FDA has historically used its authority to strictly limit the
kinds and types of information required to be disclosed on a label. Fred H. Degnan, Biotechnology and the Food Label: A Legal
Perspective, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 301, 306 (2000).
43analysis.
Thus, the FDA's own analysis of the labeling issues in the irradiation context demonstrates that the FDA
may have the statutory authority to require labeling of genetically modied foods. Not only have consumers
indicated to the FDA that they have a strong preference for such labeling,211 but it is clear that in the
absence of such information, they would be unable to distinguish genetically engineered foods from their
non-genetically engineered counterparts.212 In explaining the need for a mandatory labeling requirement to
avoid the possibility of mislabeling, the FDA stated \irradiation may not change the food in any way that is
visible to a consumer, so a label statement provides the only means of letting consumers know that a food
has been irradiated. Thus, the absence of a label statement on retail foods may incorrectly suggest that an
irradiated food is essentially unprocessed."213 Similarly, there is no way for consumers purchasing bioengi-
neered foods to know that these processing techniques have been applied to the food they are purchasing. In
fact, this indistinguishability is precisely why consumers and consumer activists are pushing for mandatory
labeling of genetic engineered foods.214 Consumer expectations and preferences are properly at the heart of
materiality and other labeling decisions.
In the irradiation labeling policy, the FDA noted that irradiation of certain foods may aect the organoleptic
properties of food as a justication for the materiality decision.215 In fact, in defending the non-labeling pol-
icy for genetically engineered foods the FDA has suggested that the irradiation labeling decision was based
solely and entirely on is ndings about changes in organoleptic properties caused by irradiation.216 However,
the FDA's original nding on irradiation and organoleptic changes was extremely limited in scope. The
FDA noted that \irradiation cause certain changes in foods and that even small changes that pose no safety
21166 Fed. Reg. at 4840
212Consumer Focus Group, supra note 5.
21351 Fed. Reg. at 13390.
214Consumer Focus Groups, supra note 5.
21551 Fed. Reg. at 13390.
21658 Fed. Reg. at 25838.
44hazard can aect the avor or texture of a food in a way that may be unacceptable to some consumers."217
Similarly, the agency noted that \under certain conditions irradiation causes substantial changes in the
organoleptic properties of some foods"218 Notably FDA does not argue that irradiation processing aects
the organoleptic properties (i.e. taste, color, smell, or texture) of all foods to which it is applied, or that
such changes would be noticeable to any signicant percentage of consumers.219 Rather, the agency suggests
only that application of this process may aect the organoleptic properties of some foods as a justication
for a blanket labeling requirement for all irradiated foods. Of course, this argument can be extended to
the genetic engineering process. Genetic engineering could undoubted be used to change the organoleptic
properties of some foods|in fact, in some instances changing taste and texture of a particular food is the
precise purpose of the engineering. Thus, under the FDA's line of reasoning in the irradiation context, such
potential changes in organoleptic properties of some of the items to which the process is applied supplies
sucient justication to require labeling of all foods to which the process is applied.
The agency did, however, create one notable limit on it's irradiation labeling requirement; mandatory label-
ing was only required in the case of \rst generation foods," i.e. fresh fruits, vegetables, raw meat, etc.220
The FDA does not require labeling if irradiation has been applied to \one ingredient in a multiple-ingredient
food."221 The FDA based this distinction on consumer expectations|basically arguing that consumers have
do not expect rst generation foods to be processed in any way, but that consumers are generally aware that
multi- ingredient foods have been processed.222 It should be noted that this distinction is not statutorily
required, particularly since many of the mandatory labeling of food processes cited by the FDA (i.e. minced
sh in sh sticks, minced onions in onion rings, dehydrated potatoes in potato chips) apply in cases where
21751 Fed. Reg. at 113390
21851 Fed. Reg. at 13390.
219Taste tests suggest that this change can often not be detected at all. See Public Voice for Food and Health Policy, national
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45it is clear that the food has also been processed in other ways. Nevertheless, FDA has consistently focused
its analysis on consumers' expectations, not on an abstract notion of the worth of particular pieces of infor-
mation. In this instance, FDA may simply have been oering a political compromise between no mandatory
labeling requirement, and an across the board labeling requirement.
The essential point for purposes of comparison with the FDA's genetic engineering analysis is the extent to
which the FDA has historically emphasized consumer expectations. In fact, the FDA's focus on consumer
expectations is entirely appropriate since the labeling was required under the FDA's misbranding authority.
Any misbranding inquiry, by denition, hinges on determinations about consumers expectations about the
product based on the information that appears on the label, and information that does not appear on the
label. Nevertheless, FDA's responses to consumer calls for labeling of genetically engineered foods notably
do not analyze consumer's expectations, but focus solely on safety and health issues. This analysis of safety
and health issues as dispositive of labeling requirements is logically tenuous. After all, if the FDA had found
genetically engineered foods to be unsafe or to cause damaging long term health issues, then presumably
such problems would be handled under the FDA's adulteration authority, not its labeling authority. Thus,
the FDA's standard \no proven health or safety risks" answer to calls for mandatory labeling simply seem
inopposite. Consumer pressure for mandatory labeling are premised primarily on arguments about consumer
expectations of food products, not on health or safety concerns. The misbranding analysis in the irradiation
case demonstrates that these are legitimate statutorily based concerns223 by making it clear that irradition
223Interestingly, the FDA does not explicitly state that health concerns would be the only material fact that it would consider.
66 Fed. Reg. 4839, 4840 (\comments [requesting mandatory labeling] do not provide data or other information regarding
consequences to consumers from eating the foods or any other basis for us to nd under section 201(n) f the act that such
disclosure was a material fact...We are still not aware of any data or other information that would form a basis for concluding
that the fact that a food or its ingredients was produced using bioengineering is a material fact that must be disclosed...").
Nevertheless, by dismissing calls for mandatory labeling so summarily, the FDA ignores its own misbranding analysis. Moreover,
the fact that FDA considers genetic engineering \material" or signicant enough a food process to mandate pre-market notice
to the agency undercuts its insistence that genetic engineering is not a \material fact" for purposes of labeling authority. All
of the arguments used to justify pre-market notice{ increased possibility of allergenic materials, increased possibility that the
added material would not meet the GRAS standard, increased possibility of misbranding or adulteration|could all be used to
also justify labeling of these foods.
46labeling requirement was \not based on any concern about...safety."224
Notably, the FDA did not consider the possibility of consumer confusion or overreaction to an irradiation
label to be a sucient justication for abandoning a labeling requirement. Instead, the FDA declared that
\any confusion created by the presence of a retail label requirement can be corrected by consumer education
programs."225 FDA acknowledged the need for public education, but indicated that \FDA has no proper
role as a promoter of a specic food additive or food process. The agency believes the primary responsibil-
ity for such educational activities remains with industry in this instance." [emphasis added]226 The FDA
unambiguously stated that responsibility for consumer acceptance and ultimate success of a new processing
technique lies squarely with the food producers, not with the FDA.227
Almost every FDA argument advanced in favor of labeling irradiated foods could also be made in support of
mandatory labeling of bioengineered foods. In this section, I will discuss a number of possible explanations
for the conicting interpretations of the labeling requirements in these two cases.
Perhaps FDA's divergent policies can be traced to the \legal status" of these processes, since irradiation
is regulated as a food additive, while the FDA considers genetically transferred substances GRAS. Irradia-
tion is specically listed as a food additive in the statute,228 and the Senate Report on the Food Additives
Amendment of 1958 stated that \[s]ources of radiation (including radioactive isotopes, particle accelerators
and X-ray machines) intended for use in processing food are included in the term `food additive' as dened
in this legislation."229 Irradiation is thus statutorily dened as an additive while the FDA has considered
genetically engineered foods to fall under the GRAS exception to the food additive denition. Conceivably,
bioengineered food products would properly be subject to the analysis set forth in the irradiation context if
22451 Fed. Reg. at 13388.
22551 Fed. Reg. at 13389.
22651 Fed. Reg. at 13395.
227This position is clearly necessitated by the need to ensure the FDA's objectivity and ability to ensure public health. If FDA
promotes, or seems to be promoting, the interests of a particular food or drug producer, or a particular food or drug industry,
entanglement issues will inevitably arise.
22851 FR 13376, 13376, citing 21 U.S.C. x 321(s).
22951 FR at 13376, citing S. Rep. No. 2422, at 5 (1958).
47these products were regulated under the food additives provisions. Perhaps because these foods fall under
the GRAS exemption, it may appropriate to analyze bioengineered foods to dierent standards than irradi-
ated foods for FDA labeling analysis purposes.
Nevertheless, the language in the Senate report indicating that the food additive denition includes \sources
of radiation intended for use in processing food" could reasonably be interpreted to mean that the legislature
broadly intended to include all high-tech, or novel processing techniques in its denition of \food additive."
After all, it would have been impossible for the legislature to have even conceived of the possibility of bioengi-
neering in 1958 when the Food Additives Amendment was passed. By analogy, if the Congress considered
radiation to be a food additive for purposes of the Act, it is not unreasonable to assume that the legislature
may also have considered bioengineering to be a food additive for purposes of the Act. Such an interpretation
is consistent with the intent of the Food Additives Amendment which was to \require the processor who
wants to add a new and unproven additive to accept the responsibility...of rst proving it to be safe for
ingestion of human beings"230 and to prevent food processors from \using an untested additive for as long
a time as it may take for the Government to suspect the deleteriousness of his additives."231
As noted above,232 the FDA's determination that products added to food plants through bioengineering are
GRAS is not statutorily mandated. The agency exercised considerable discretion in creating a presumption
that added genetic material was \generally recognized as safe." The fact that process and analysis for deter-
mining GRAS status for GM foods is dierent from determining GRAS status for other foods233 mitigates
against the FDA's position that the current statutory framework is sucient to deal with all of the issues
raised by GM foods. The FDA could just have appropriately treated transferred genetic material as \food
230S. Rep. No. 2422, at 2 (1958).
231Id.
232Supra section IV.A.2.
233Memorandum \FDA Regulation of Food Products Derived From Genetically-Altered Plants: Points to Consider" available
at http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>>. (noting that the Food Additive/GRAS option is \at odds with emerging FDA
legal interpretations of what is required to achieve GRAS status, including `publication' requirement.")
48additives" rather than as GRAS.
Alternatively, perhaps the dierence in the FDA's treatment of irradiation and bioengineering can be at-
tributed to the eects of processes on the foods themselves. Although irradiation is a discrete process with
relatively identiable eects on foods and food ingredients, bioengineering actually encompasses a number
of techniques, and the possible eects on bioengineered foods are as variable as the number of dierent gene
combinations. Genes from any number of living organisms can be added to foods, causing an almost innite
variety of eects. This variability in the eect and purpose of agricultural biotechnology may explain FDA's
reluctance to label all bioengineered foods in the same way. After all, in reading that a particular food
product is irradiated, a consumer can be relatively sure of the technological process applied to that food.
If a consumer reads a food label indicating that the food product is bioengineered, this could mean that a
ounder gene has been added to its genetic code, that a bacterial gene has been added to its genetic code,
or that a shelf life preserving gene has been added.234 This approach would explain the FDA's resistance to
labeling because the agency does not know of genetic modications changing foods in any \meaningful or
uniform way."235 However, the mandatory irradiation labeling policy also acknowledges that the irradiation
does not have the same eects on all irradiated foods.236
Moreover, the FDA already treats agricultural biotechnology as a single process at least for purposes of
requiring premarket notice. To the extent that the FDA itself sees \genetically engineered foods" to be a
single salient category for its own regulatory purposes, it could easily extrapolate that consumers also would
consider the same category salient. The fact that a label would provide too little information, or information
that is not detailed enough, is not a strong argument for the denial of any information at all. At any rate,
234This argument was advanced at the recent public forum on biotechnogy by Mario Teisl, a Professor in the Department of
Resource Economics and Policy, at the University of Maine. He stated, \A simple GE label will not allow most consumers to
dierentiate products in the manner they most desire because the process of genetic engineering can produce a wide variety of
consequences." Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond, supra note 22 at 141.
23557 Fed. Reg. at 22991.
23651 Fed. Reg. at 13390.
49this was not an argument advanced directly by the FDA, although this argument has been advanced by
other groups opposed to mandatory labeling.237
Another possible explanation for the inconsistency in approaches can be attributed to changes in the reg-
ulatory climate at the times these technologies were being regulated, rather than the characteristics of the
processes themselves. In the case of biotechnology, FDA seemed to have been under substantial pressure to
base its policies solely on science|which in this context seems to have been meant ignoring any possible,
but as yet unproven harms,238 whereas regulations regarding irradiation exhibited much more concern for
consumer expectations of their foods. The FDA's respective Federal Register policy statements for irradi-
ation and bioengineering reect this shift in regulatory posture. In the 1986 irradiation policy, the FDA
emphasized the importance of avoiding consumer misinformation, but in the 1992 genetic engineering policy,
the same agency emphasized the importance of a strict adherence to \known scientic risks" as the only
justication for labeling in the bioengineering context.
This shift towards an insistence on scientic evidence of risk as a justication for labeling between 1986 and
1992 may have corresponded to a more general shift in FDA labeling attitudes. In 1991, the FDA stated that
it was \unwilling to require a warning statement in the absence of clear evidence of a hazard,"239 and later
in 1993 the FDA again stated that it \does not intend to require warning statements on food labels except
in specic instances where there is scientically based evidence of a potential health hazard."240 These
statements suggest that the FDA might consider any labeling requirement as a \warning label," and strictly
237Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond, supra note 22 at 141.
238Memorandum from Dr. Gerald B. Guest, Director of the Center for Veterinary Medicine, to Dr. James Maryanski,
Biotechnology Coordinator, Re: \Regulation of Transgenic Plants|FDA Draft Federal Register Notice on Food Biotechnology,"
(Feb. 5, 1992), available at <<http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>>.
239Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the `Right to Know' From the `Need to Know' about Consumer Product
Hazards, 11 Yale J. on Reg. 293, 317-8 (1994), citing Food Labeling; Declaration of Ingredients, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,592, 28,615
(1991)
240Id., citing Food Labeling; Declaration of Ingredients, 58 Fed. Reg. 2850, 2872 (1993).
50limit the kind of information required to be disclosed on the label. However, a label indicating the presence
of bioengineered products could easily be characterized as an informational label rather than a warning label.
Just as labels indicating that orange juice has been pasteurized are not warning labels, information about
genetic engineering could be regarded as informational.
Interestingly, in FDA's recent discussion of materiality in the \Voluntary Guidance for Industry" the FDA
argued that it has historically interpreted the materiality standard narrowly. The agency argued that it
has only required the disclosure of such information when \the absence of such information may: 1) pose
special health or environmental risks...; 2) mislead the consumer in light of other statements made on the
label...; 3) in cases where a consumer may assume that a food, because of its similarity to another food,
has nutritional, organoleptic, or functional characteristics of the food it resembles when in fact it does not
(e.g. reduced fat margarine not suitable for frying"241 Other commentators supportive of the current FDA
policy also argue that the FDA has historically limited the amount of information considered material.242
However, this position sharply contrasts with the FDA's 1986 broad interpretation of its labeling authority
which stated that \FDA has historically required the disclosure of a food processing agent whenever it is
material to the processing of foods."243
In fact, the FDA's has recently signaled that it is considering revising its irradiated foods labeling policy
in response to the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (\FDAMA") which \directed
FDA to publish for public comment proposed changes to current regulations relating to labeling of foods
treated with ionizing radiation".244 The legislative history directs that \any required irradiation disclosure
241Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengi-
neering, available at <http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/dms/biolabgu.html>.
242Fred H. Degnan, Biotechnology and the Food Label: A Legal Perspective, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 301, 306 (2000) (\The
agency has exercised that authority sparingly, largely reserving its use for the disclosure of truly important, noncollateral and
nonlabel-cluttering `material' information")
24351 Fed. Reg. at 13388.
24421 C.F.R. Part 179 available at <http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/fr990217.html>.
51to be of a type and character such that it would not be perceived to be a warning or give rise to inappropriate
consumer anxiety."245 This shift in irradiation labeling policy may evidence of a growing general legislative
and regulatory desire to keep food labeling to a minimum, at least in cases where the labels might \be
perceived as a warning or give rise to inappropriate consumer anxiety." This fear of an \inappropriate"
consumer reaction may also drive the FDA's determination to avoid labeling of GE foods.246
Another possible background explanation for the discrepancy in treatment of the two technologies might sim-
ply be the nature of the constituencies with a nancial interest in the technologies at hand. The biotechnology
rms may enjoy more concentrated political inuence in lobbying government agencies than industries with
an interest in promoting irradiation of foods. The biotechnology rms represent a cohesive interest group
organized through the Biotechnology Industry Organization, or BIO,247 whereas those advocating irradiation
were likely to be less well organized and spread across a number of food industries.248 Moreover, biotech-
nology rms may have noted how sparsely irradiation was actually used in the market after the decision
to require mandatory labeling,249 and decided that mandatory labeling would signal the death knell for
agricultural biotechnology as well.250
B.
245Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 64 Fed. Reg. 7834, 7835 (February 17, 1999), quoting
Conf. Rep. on S. 830, Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 143 Cong. Rec. H10452, 10477 (November
9, 1997).
246Infra section V.
247Tanya E. Karwaki, Note and Comment, The FDA and the Biotechnology Industry: A Symbiotic Relationship?, 71 Wash.
L. Rev. 821, 835 (1996)
248Irradiation can be applied to everything from meats, to fruits and vegetables, to spices. See
Marian Burros, Irradiated Beef: In Markets, Quietly, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 2001 available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/28/living/28WELL.html?printpage=yes> (\The federal government has also approved
irradiation of poultry, pork, grains, fruits, vegetables and spices, but very little beyond spices is being irradiated.")
249Id.
250Id. At least one of the causes of the relative lack of irradiated foods available in the supermarkets is due to fear of a negative
consumer reaction.
52The Science defense is not really absolute.
1. Science cannot dictate labeling policy.
Although the FDA generally defends it regulatory stance towards genetically engineered foods as science
based, this defense is inopposite in the context of the labeling debate. Scientic data, no matter how
complete or accurate, does not provide any clear policy answers to the fundamental question of what kinds
of information producers should be required to provide to consumers. Although scientic data and analysis
is the primary and proper focus of safety determinations for purposes of the adulteration sections of the act,
labeling policy is rst and foremost about what kinds of information would be useful to consumers. Scientic
evidence may provide very relevant evidence about particular kinds of risks. However, the nal choice over
what information should be required to appear on a label has as much to do with one's understanding of
the FDA's role in mediating consumer and industry preferences as it does with one's view of the scientic
evidence. Labeling issues are not fundamentally questions of science, but questions of policy judgment. The
irradiation rules indicate that an analysis of consumer expectations and preferences are clearly relevant in
this debate.
All labeling arguments are political. The \consumer right to know" may be an unscientic standard, but
the argument that consumers do not need to know about small or unproven risks is likewise an unscientic
argument. Like all other labeling arguments, this controversy hinges on when the FDA should compelled
manufacturers and other food producers to provide consumers with information. Under a standard in which
labeling would only be compelled in cases of a clear health risk, such labeling would virtually never be
required since such foods would not be permitted in the market in the rst place. Thus, in order for
the interpret the statutory structure in such a way that ascribes the labeling provisions with independent
meaning, labeling must be required in cases other than where a clear health risk has been demonstrated.
53This issue fundamentally concerns whether manufacturers and the government trust consumers to make
responsible use of this information, not whether the underlying products are safe for human consumption.
These arguments involve the proper distribution of information in the market, and by extension, the proper
distribution of power in the market. In such a debate, science does not and cannot provide any denitive
answers.
Of course, it is easy to see why the FDA has an interest in arguing that the labeling policy is based solely
on science. Scientic evidence seems \objective," and is generally considered authoritative, and the FDA
has a clear interest in being perceived as objective and not inuenced by political factors.251 Claiming
that a political decision is based on \science" may give the agency political cover for controversial decisions.
Nevertheless, in the case of labeling policy, all judgment calls implicate political, not just scientic, judgments.
2. Agricultural Biotechnology does Pose Risks.
Very few advocates would argue that the application of biotechnology to agriculture poses no risks what-
soever. The real question is over who should be equipped with information about possible risks when the
extent of the risk is under real dispute or is unknown. Biotechnology is still a new technology, and many of
the underlying biological and chemical implications and eects are not completely understood. According
to Richard Lewontin, a Harvard geneticist, the eects of genetic engineering are not entirely predictable. He
stated, \You can always intervene and change something in it [a gene], but there's no way of knowing what
all the downstream eects will be or how it might aect the environment. We have such a miserably poor
understanding of how the organism develops from its DNA that I would be surprised if we don't get one
251Dan Glickman, New Crops, New Century, New Challenges: How Will Scientists, Farmers, And Consumers Learn to Love
Biotechnology and What Happens If They Don't?, Address Before the National Press Club (July 13, 1999), available at
<http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1999/02/0285>. [hereinafter Glickman Address]
54rude shock after another."252
FDA's 1992 policy document argued that the labeling should not be required because \the agency is not
aware of any information showing that foods derived by these new methods dier from other foods in any
meaningful or uniform way, or that, as a class, foods developed by these new techniques present any dierent
or greater safety concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding."253 The agency did not arm
that such foods were not dierent from other foods, or that that these foods were actually safe, but simply
that it \was not aware of any information" indicating such foods were materially dierent or unsafe. Thus,
FDA seems to have been operating under the working assumption that these foods would safe, and then
required scientic evidence that the food was unsafe in order to justify additional regulatory scrutiny. This
working assumption was probably based on its understanding that bioengineering was just an extension of
traditional plant breeding techniques.
However, even at the time that the FDA made these determinations, these conclusions had been challenged
by agency employees. For instance, Dr. Linda Kahl, an FDA compliance ocer stated that \[t]he processes
of genetic engineering and traditional breeding are dierent, and according to the technical experts in the
agency, they lead to dierent risks." [emphasis in original]254 Dr. Louis J. Pribyl also characterized the
policy as \inconsistent, in that it says (implies) that there are no dierence between traditional breeding and
recombinant, yet consultations, and premarket approvals are being bantered around, when they have not
been used before. In fact, the FDA is making a distinction, so why pretend otherwise."255 Like Kahl, Pribyl
noted the \profound dierence between the types of unexpected eects from traditional breeding and genetic
252Michael Pollan, Playing God in the Garden, N.Y. Times Mag., Oct. 25, 1998, available at 1998 WL 22330020.
25357 Fed. Reg. 22991.
254Comments from Dr. Linda Kahl, FDA compliance ocer, to Dr. James Maryanski, FDA Biotechnology Co-
ordinator, Re: \Statement of Policy: Foods from Genetically Modied Plants," 2 (January 8, 1992), available at
<http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>.
255Comments from Dr. Louis J. Pribyl, Re: \Biotechnology Draft Document, 2/27/92" 1 (Mar. 6, 1992), available at
<http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>.
55engineering which is just glanced over in this document."256 Similarly, Gerald B. Guest, Director for the
Center of Veterinary Medicine argued that genetically engineered animal feeds \present unique animal and
food safety concerns."257 Interestingly, Dr Guest's memo also suggests that the FDA 1992 policy backs away
from previous safety standards, \I and other scientists [sic] at CVM have concluded there is ample scientic
justication to support a premarket review of these products...The FDA will be confronted with new plant
constituents that could be of toxicological or environmental concern...It has always been our position that
the sponsor needs to generate the appropriate scientic information to demonstrate product safety to humans,
animals and the environment." [emphasis added]258 Thus, one of the FDA's own senior scientists suggested
that the 1992 policy lowered the safety standards for genetically engineered foods.
FDA employees also expressed discomfort with the FDA's insistence that it's policy was based on scientic
evidence. Dr. Kahl further questioned whether the FDA's position amounted to \asking the scientic ex-
perts to generate for this policy statement in the absence of any data."259 In fact, Dr. Guest \urge[d] Mr
Maryansky to eliminate statements that suggest that the lack of information can be used as evidence for no
regulatory concern."260 Dr. Pribyl noted that the FDA had adopted \the industry's pet idea, namely that
there are no unintended eects that will raise the FDA's level of concern. But time and time again, there is
no data to backup their contention."261
In fact, it seems that at least some divisions at the FDA had advised a more cautious regulatory stance and
were not, at least initially, completely unanimous in their support of the 1992 document's regulatory stance.
256Id.
257Memorandum from Dr. Gerald B. Guest, Director of the Center for Veterinary Medicine, to Dr. James Maryanski,
Biotechnology Coordinator, \Regulation of Transgenic Plants {FDA Draft Federal Register Notice on Food Biotechnology," 1
(Feb. 5, 1992), available at <http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>.
258Id.
259Comments from Dr. Linda Kahl, FDA Compliance Ocer, to Dr. James Maryanski, FDA Biotechnology
Coordinator, Re \Statement of Policy: Foods from Genetically Modied Plants" 2 (Jan. 8, 1992), available at
<http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>. She continued, \It's no wonder that there are so many dierent opinions{it
is an exercise in hypotheses forced on individuals whose jobs and training ordinarily deal with facts." Id.
260Memorandum from Dr. Gerald B. Guest to Dr. James Maryanski, \Regulation of Transgenic Plants|FDA Draft Federal
Register Notice on Food Biotechnology," 1 (Feb. 5, 1992), available at <http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>.
261Comments from Dr. Louis J. Pribyl, Re: \Biotechnology Draft Document, 2/27/92." 3 (March 6, 1992), available at
<http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>.
56An internal memo from Samuel I. Shibko, the FDA's Director of the Division of Toxicological Review and
Evaluation recommended traditional toxicology studies for genetically engineered foods to ensure safety.262
Nevertheless, the FDA chose not to adopt those recommendations.263 Ultimately the FDA's 1992 policy
was premised on basic assumptions about the similarity of genetically engineered foods to their conventional
counterparts. Because the FDA's conceptualized these foods as fundamentally similar to other traditional
varieties of food, FDA argued that additional regulation would only be justied by scientic evidence proving
genetically engineered foods unsafe.
While these internal FDA documents certainly do not prove that FDA was motivated by any improper
motives in crafting its 1992 policy, they do demonstrate the extent to which FDA was making policy judg-
ments in the face of a great deal of scientic uncertainty. The FDA made a decision to treat the lack of
a demonstrated scientic risk as positive evidence of safety|a decision that was neither statutorily nor
logically compelled. These documents demonstrate the extent to which reasonable, scientically informed
people, could hold dierent opinions on the extent to which GE foods should be regulated under the statu-
tory framework. Matthew Franken has pointed out that \FDA's reliance on established scientic knowledge
could also be considered a weaknesss. Because this approach is based on known risks, it is reactionary
rather than precautionary. Although scientic research has not yet discovered potential harms associated
262The memo suggested that the toxicology section be revised to say \At this time it is unlikely that molecular and com-
positional analysis can reasonably detect or predict all possible changes in toxicant levels or the development of new toxic
metabolites as a result of genetic modications introduced by new methods of biotechnology. FDA believes that, until scien-
tic data and experience with the new techniques of gene transfer have accumulated, the possibility of unexpected, accidental
changes in genetically engineered plants justies a limited traditional toxicology study with the edible part of the plant. This
study would provide a basis for assuring the absence of any new highly toxic materials that are not present in the parental plant
variety, and would establish the wholesomeness of the food for subsequent limited studies in humans. Additional assurance of
safety would be provided by in vitro genotoxicity and digestion studies with the food or appropriate extract." Memorandum
from Dr. Samuel I. Shibko to Dr. James Maryanski, Re: \Revision of Toxicology Section of the Statement of Policy: Foods
Derived from Genetically Modied Plants," 1 (January 31, 1992), available at <http://www.biointegrity.org/list.html>.
263The FDA's own Toxicology Department's recommendations notwithstanding, the toxicology section as actually published
stated, \Feeding studies or other toxicological tests may be warranted when the characteristics of the plant or the nature of the
modication raise safety concerns that cannot be resolved by analytical methods. FDA recognizes that feeding studies on whole
foods have limited sensitivity because of the inability to administer exaggerated doses. Because of the diculty of designing
meaningful studies, FDA encourages companies to consult informally with the agency about test protocols." 57 Fed. Reg. at
23004.
57with these foods, this does not mean they do not exist."264 FDA's approach was based on an interpretation
of scientic evidence, but it was not the only plausible interpretation of that evidence (or lack thereof).
Similarly, FDA's approach was based on an interpretation of the existing food regulations, but hardly the
only plausible interpretation of those regulations.
In fact, an article in Nature Magazine has suggested that the current approach to regulating genetically
engineered foods is not based on science at all. Instead, the authors contend that the FDA approach is not
scientically substantiated, arguing that \showing that a genetically modied food is chemically similar to its
natural counterpart is not adequate evidence that it is safe for human consumption."265 In fact this article
points out that, given the current state of scientic wisdom, mere knowledge of the chemical composition
of a genetically engineered food does not provide an adequate basis for scientists to accurately assess that
biochemical and toxicological risks posed by that food; the article points out that \the relationship between
genetics, chemical composition and toxicological risk remains unknown."266 Thus, these authors condemn
the current approach as \pseudo-scientic" and calls it \a commercial and political judgment masquerading
as if it were scientic."267 Further, they argue that such an approach is actually \inherently anti-scientic
because it was created primarily to provide an excuse for not requiring biochemical or toxicological tests."268
An examination of the FDA's own analysis often reveals the FDA,s attempts to shield policy decisions by
invoking \science." For instance, in defending its labeling policy, the FDA argued that \[t]here is scientic
basis to conclude that...genetic alternations do not change the essential nature of the plant."269 However,
the FDA cites no scientic evidence to support this proposition. In fact, scientic evidence could never prove
such a proposition since the \essential nature" of any organism is a hopelessly philosophical, not a scientic,
264Matthew Franken, Comment, Fear of Frankenfoods: A Better Labling Standard for Genetically Modied Foods, 1 Minn.
Intell. Prop. Rev. 153, 172 (2000).
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58question. In fact, from a scientic point of view, the only thing that could change the nature of an organism
is a change in its genetic structure, since science would tell us that the only thing that distinguishes one
organism from another is their genetic structure|the building blocks of physical existence. Science tells us
that an organism's genes dictate that organism's properties, i.e. it's nature.
3. The Risks of Genetically Engineered Foods are Still Not Fully Understood.
Despite FDA assurances that genetically engineered products had scientically been proven safe, almost
ten years after the release of the 1992 policy, the risk data regarding genetically engineered plants is still
incomplete. Science has still not determined what the real risks of this technology are. Biotech proponents
say that the benets outweigh the risks, but the purported benets (feeding the world, etc.) have yet to
be proven, and the extent of the risks (bio-disaster) have also not yet been suciently determined.270 Even
many scientists favoring the development of biotechnology concede that more research about the risks of this
technology is in order.271
Results of the few studies that have been conducted about the risks and benets of biotech food products do
not support all industry claims about the advantages of their products. Charles Benbrook, former executive
director of the National Research Council's Board on Agriculture, recently conducted a study testing the
risks and benets of Roundup Ready Soybeans. He found that the use of the Roundup Ready soybeans did
allow farmers to substitute Roundup herbicides in place of other more hazardous herbicides, and allowed
the farmers to till the soil less frequently, reducing soil erosion.272 However, he did not nd evidence to
substantiate the manufacturer's claims that the product required less herbicides than traditional soybeans;
270See L.L. Wolfenbarger & P.R. Phifer, The Ecological Risks and Benets of Genetically Engineered Plants, 290 Science
2088 (Dec. 15, 2000), available at <http://www.sciencemag.org>; Dan Ferber, Risks and Benets: GM Crops in the Cross
Hairs, 286 Science 1662 (Nov. 26, 1999), available at <http://www.sciencemag.org>.
271Dan Ferber, Risks and Benets: GM Crops in the Cross Hairs, 286 Science 1662 (Nov. 26, 1999) available at
<http://www.sciencemag.org>.
272Dan Ferber, Risks and Benets: GM Crops in the Cross Hairs, 286 Science 1662 (Nov. 26, 1999), available at
<http://www.sciencemag.org>.
59to the contrary, he concluded that \farmers applied two to ve times more herbicides of all kinds to their GM
soybean elds than to elds growing conventional soybeans."273 These results draw into question industry
assertions about the environmental benets of this product, since a greater total application of a less haz-
ardous herbicide does not necessarily create a net benet for the environment. Moreover, a study conducted
by Michael Duy at Iowa State University investigating the claims about the nancial benets of Roundup
Ready found that farmers growing the Roundup Ready beans made no more money than farmers growing
the non- genetically modied variety.274
These studies demonstrate that questions about the real risks and benets of genetically modied foods are
not raised solely by political activists and isolated scientists. Scientists and other risk analysis professionals
acknowledge that much of the safety and environmental eects of genetically engineered foods have not been
adequately studied. In fact, although drugs and pesticides have generally undergone risk analysis, according
to James Cook, a plant pathologist at Washington State University in Pullman, risk analysis methods have
never been applied to any plants, let along genetically engineered plants.275 Nor did the FDA involve any
experts in risk analysis in developing its 1992 policy.276 Accordingly, industry and government claims that
the benets of genetically engineered outweigh the risks have not been veried by risk analysis experts.
Respected scientic journals have also acknowledged the substantial degree of scientic uncertainty about the
eects of genetically engineered foods.277 A recent article published in Science magazine by L.L. Wolfenbarger
and P.R. Phifer noted that \key experiments on both the environmental risks and benets [of genetically
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60engineered foods] are lacking."278 Additionally, some scientists worry that regulatory agencies such as the
FDA may be \overestimat[ing] their ability to predict allergenicity." 279 An article in Nature pointed out
that there are still areas of scientic uncertainty regarding the potential for genetic engineering to trigger
allergenic reactions and that \there is a broader consensus that he potential ecological disturbance caused
by a growing dependence on GM crops by modern farmers could be signicant."280 In fact, the same arti-
cle opined that \[t]he public is right to be concerned about the potential|and novel|hazards of modern
food production techniques."281 Similarly, a recent article in the Annual Review of Genetics and Human
Genomics noted that the public reaction to genetic engineering reects its discomfort with the fact that \the
reshaping of American farmland with millions of acres of transgenic crops has proceeded too quickly and
in a manner that precludes adequate assessment of environmental and health issues; and that government
has failed to discharge its regulatory obligations."282 Moreover, the article concludes describes this public
unease as \a rational response to the discovery that a major change has taken place in the world that was
conducted largely without public knowledge."283 These claims of scientic uncertainty do not come from the
political ideologues motivated by a deep seeded vendetta against the biotech industry, but from thoughtful
scientists acknowledging the lack of scientic evidence.
4. Lack of Research.
The simple truth is that there is not enough research being conducted about the ecological aects of ge-
netically engineered foods.284 This paucity in research is partly due to a lack of funds for research about
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61biosafety.285 The U.S. Department of Agriculture spends around $1.5 million a year on biosafety research,
amounting to only 1% of its total biotech research budget.286 Moreover, researchers have few natural incen-
tives to become involved in biotech toxicity studies because such research \tend[s] to yield negative results
that are dicult to publish and account for to funding agencies."287 Although the Biotechnology Industry
Organization has supported the call for more studies of ecological risks, biotech rms are unwilling to pay
for such studies.288
Given the fact that much of the science on the potential risks of biotechnology in agriculture has been incon-
clusive or incomplete, it is hard to know what to make of the government's steadfast insistence that its policy
is based on science. Perhaps the government should consider the journal Nature's admonition: \[b]oth sides
should acknowledge the current limits to scientic certainty. The failure to `prove' scientically that a new
food is dangerous is not the same as to have `proved' that it is safe."289 In calling for the regulation of GM
foods based on \the soundest possible science" 290 an opinion piece written in Nature noted that nothing is
to be gained in \[b]asing regulations on scientic conclusions that later turn out to be false."291 Basing a
policy on an assumption that biotech foods are safe for the environment and human health without requiring
armative evidence for these propositions may lead to a situation in which evidence of such environmental or
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62health risks may come too late to avoid real damage.292 It is true that the scientic establishment generally
believes that the current regulatory safeguards are adequate to protect the public,293 but \[e]ven among
ardent supporters of GM foods...calls are being increasingly heard for more research on health risks, and for
the introduction of monitoring systems that would allow the early detection of any long-term problems"294
The degree of scientic uncertainty about these foods only underscores the extent to which the current
agricultural biotechnology is based on policy judgments. The FDA's minimal regulatory approach towards
genetically engineered foods \seems incongruous with the traditional approach to risk-assessment, where data
accumulates on a product, experience with it grows, and the tendency toward strict regulation relaxes."295
At the very least, the FDA should acknowledge that the assumption that genetically engineered foods are
safe \until it is conclusively proven otherwise"296 represents a policy, not a scientic, judgment.
C.
The FDA's Policy Reects Political Pressures.
FDA's insistent characterization of its biotech policies as \science based" may reect a defense against the
suggestion that its regulations have been shaped by subject to inappropriate inuence by the biotechnol-
ogy industry. The FDA may be particularly worried about charges of \agency capture" through which a
regulated industry \is able to use its political inuence to force the agency to promulgate regulations that
are preferential to the industry and perhaps contrary to the agency's intended purpose."297 Government
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63agencies may be vulnerable to such inuence because of the agency's interest in preserving its prestige and
power, or because individual employees may have an interest in eventually obtaining employment with the
companies that they are policing.298 Both of these factors may lead FDA to attempt to cultivate \industry
goodwill" by tailoring regulations to the concerns and needs of the biotech industry.299 Karwaki argues that
the relationship between the FDA and the biotech industry, at least in the domain of pharmaceuticals, is
adversarial rather than cooperative.300
Nevertheless, the activists have expressed concern about the possibility of inappropriate industry inuence
in the agricultural biotech arena. At a recent public forum on genetic engineering held by the FDA, critics
of the current policy consistently noted the possibility of such inappropriate incentives for FDA to develop
industry-friendly policies, particularly in order to expand career options. In particular, these participants
charged that Michael Taylor, the deputy commissioner of policy for the FDA at the time that the genetically
engineered bovine growth hormone was approved for marketing, and involved in the crafting of FDA's policy
towards genetically engineered foods, was later hired as Monsanto's vice president for public policy.301 Al-
though the FDA clearly cannot exercise control over whether its employees are later hired by the regulated
industries, such employment moves do elicit public suspicion.302 The possibility of inappropriate agency
inuence over individual FDA employees with interests in career moves into the regulated industry threatens
the public's willingness to trust regulatory agencies. 303
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303Secretary Glickman argued, \we created a food safety agency separate and distinct from any and all marketing functions
to ensure that no commercial interests have even the appearance of inuence on our decisions regarding food safety. It needs
to be the same with biotechnology. The scientists who evaluate and approve biotech products for the market must be free of
any hint of inuence from trade support and other non-regulatory areas within USDA." Glickman Address, supra note 251.
64An additional factor that may lead to concerns about agency capture in the agricultural biotech context is
the industry and FDA's expressed shared interest in quelling consumer concerns about the biotechnology.
There is much evidence to suggest that the FDA's policy was designed, at least in part, to meet a shared
objective with the biotech industry of gaining public acceptance of genetically engineered foods. In fact,
in FDA's 1992 policy announcement acknowledged that it was in part a response to appeals from the food
biotechnology industry which \expressed to FDA the need for strong but appropriate oversight by Federal
agencies to ensure public condence in foods produced by new techniques."304 Agricultural biotech compa-
nies actually have an incentive to gain the public perception that their foods are just as safe as traditionally
derived foods, and the FDA \stamp of approval" is extremely valuable in that regard.305 In fact, FDA
regulatory approval is seen as valuable in helping new biotech companies to \establish an image of safety
and credibility."306
The biotech industry often points to FDA review as evidence that the foods are being regulated.307 Kessler
indicated that the decision tree approach in the 1992 policy \was a critical part of the document, because
the industry wants to have an agreed upon scientic basis for evaluating (and assuring the public about) the
safety of these products."308 Similarly, the new mandatory premarket review process recently proposed by
the FDA was actually applauded by the industry because it was hoped that such review would reassure cus-
tomers that these products were being examined by regulatory agencies. Ironically, the requirement did not
actually create any additional burdens of producers of genetically engineered products since those products
were already routinely being submitted in the voluntary review process.309
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65Documents from the FDA suggest that its policies have been designed to help the industry garner public
support for these foods, and provide the industry with assurances about the regulatory structure to be ap-
plied to those foods. An internal FDA memo noted that the 1992 biotech policy was motivated partly by an
objective to \provide assurance to the public that foods derived from modern biotechnology processes...are
being adequately regulated."310 Commissioner Kessler himself argued that it was \critical not only to pro-
vide [agricultural biotech companies] with a predictable guide to government oversight, but also to help them
win public acceptance of these new products."311 Kessler specically noted the FDA's \extensive contact
with the food biotechnology industry, outside scientists, and other interested parties"312 in establishing the
1992 policy. He also noted that the policy \responds to White House interest in assuring the safe, speedy
development of the U.S. biotechnology industry,"313 acknowledging that political actors had inuence over
the development over FDA's policy. Moreover, the memo indicates that the FDA was aware, even before
publication of the policy that it was likely to cause protest from a collation of groups which had advocated
\formal food additive premarket approval" for genetically engineered foods.314
These documents demonstrate that the FDA was not motivated purely by a desire to seek scientic truth,
but also by desires to accommodate the interest of both the biotech industry and the White House. In fact,
the impetus for releasing the 1992 policy was explicitly political, not scientic. The policy was \designed to
promote a profusion of new products and...spur investment in agricultural biotech stocks."315 In fact, the
atmosphere surrounding the release of this new policy was plainly political, it \reect[ed] ...election-year
310\FDA Regulation of Food Products Derived From Genetically Altered Plants: Points to Consider" 1, available at
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66eorts by the White House to provide all industry with as much regulatory relief as possible."316
In fact, FDA policy has generally followed industry preferences for regulation. The biotechnology industry
is generally supportive of both mandatory FDA review,317 and voluntary labeling,318 and the industry also
supports the FDA policy against mandatory labeling. Of course, this correlation between government policy
and industry preferences does not prove that government policy has been crafted by agency lobbying, but
it certainly does not help to dispel the specter of agency capture. This correlation between the industry's
regulatory preferences and the FDA's actual regulatory system suggests that the relationship between agri-
cultural biotechnology companies and the FDA is less adversarial than might otherwise be expected.
In fact, almost from the inception of the application of biotechnology to agriculture, the federal government's
statements about the industry have been overwhelmingly positive and pro-industry. White House press re-
leases touting the \enormous promise of this technology"319 sound almost as if they could have been written
by Monsanto itself, making the claim that the government regulations are based solely on known and proven
scientic risks and benets questionable. After all, although scientists speculate that biotechnology has the
potential to \feed the world," this is hardly a known and proven benet of biotechnology. Just as concerns
about the risks of biotechnology have been characterized by the FDA as \expressions of concern about the
unknown,"320 similarly, the touted benets of biotechnology could fairly be characterized as \expressions of
hope about the unknown." Nevertheless, government agencies and actors consistently tout the enormous
promise of bioengineered food. For instance, Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman, has promoted the
potential for agricultural biotechnology to do everything from \combat[ing] hunger" to \solv[ing] the most
vexing environmental problems"321
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67As early as 1984, when the industry was still in its infancy, the government had seemed to have made a
decidedly political decision to promote biotechnology. In the 1984 Proposal for Coordinated Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology,322 the government explicitly framed its regulatory stance towards biotechnol-
ogy in terms of its desire to promote the growth and success of the industry. The proposal states, \[t]he
tremendous potential of biotechnology to contribute to the nation's economy in the near term, and to fulll
society's needs and alleviate its problems in the longer term, makes it imperative that progress in biotech-
nology be encouraged."323 The language of the eventual recommendations were similarly eusive, describing
the technology's potential \to bring considerable benets to mankind."324 Biotechnology was cleared framed
as a technology which the government had an interest in developing. Moreover, the benets of the technology
were framed in terms of the competitiveness of the American industry: \[t]he United States is now the world
leader in biotechnology. This leadership is derived from a strong scientic base, a vigorous entrepreneurial
spirit and availability of venture capital."325
The 1984 framework explicitly stated its desire to encourage minimal regulation in order to encourage de-
velopment of the industry, stating that it was aiming towards developing a regulatory process that would
\minimize the uncertainties and ineciencies that can stie innovation and impair the competitiveness of the
U.S. industry."326 Notably absent from this policy was any direct discussion of the interests and concerns of
consumers. Nor do these early pronouncements on the regulation of biotechnology mention risks that might
be posed by this extremely new technology. Although Commissioner Kessler indicated that the agency had
consulted extensively with \the food biotechnology industry, outside scientists, and other interested par-
ties,"327 it is not clear whether he had considered consumers to be an \interested party" for purposes of
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68crafting the 1992 policy. In fact, Pribyl noted that the draft document \read very pro-industry"328 and that
it \contain[ed] very little input from consumers and only a few answers for their concerns."329
Interestingly, it was in the context of this extremely optimistic view of the promise of biotechnology and
the stated goal of fostering the development of the industry that the working group indicated that \regu-
latory decisions should be based upon the best available science."330 Indeed, the working group statement
specically framed its goal of minimizing regulation as motivated in part by its desire to maintain the \com-
petitiveness of U.S. producers in both domestic and world markets."331 This policy statement represents
a notably departure from FDA's previous statement that \the FDA has no proper role as a promoter of a
specic food additive or food process."332
While the statements of the Working Group cannot be attributed solely to the FDA, it is worth noting that
the FDA rst started considering the issues surrounding the regulation of biotechnology in the context of
this governmental directive explicitly advocating the promotion of the biotech industry and a minimalist
regulatory framework. Although the FDA had not set forth an extensive policy statement until 1992, as
early as 1986 the agency had already stated that it \would regulate genetically engineering products no
dierently tha[n] [sic] those achieved through traditional techniques."333 The Working Group established
through the Coordinated Framework stated that \[t]he new products that will be brought to market will
generally t within these agencies' review and approval regimes."334 This decision to regulate bioengineered
products under the existing regulatory framework was explicitly regarded in terms of the advantage that
such a regulatory stance would have for the industry: \existing health and safety laws ha[ve] the advantage
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69that they could provide more immediate regulatory protection and certainty for the industry than possible
with the implementation of new legislation."[italics added]335
Thus, even as early as the mid-1980s, the government had wholeheartedly embraced biotechnology and the
biotech industry, and made a commitment to the industry's growth and prosperity. Although these early
government directives did indicate that safety regulation should be based on \science," it did so clearly
in a context of promotion of the industry rather than a thoughtful exploration of the possible risks and
benets of the technology. Those risks and benets had simply not been scientically established at that
early date; in fact those risks and benets are still far from certain. Moreover, although these documents
indicated government and industry desires to promote or ensure success of genetically engineered foods in
the marketplace, they did not acknowledge that the regulatory framework they set out would do little to
inform consumers that they were even purchasing these foods.
Given this contextual framework for the FDA's policy towards agricultural biotechnology, the FDA's ar-
gument that its biotechnology policies are grounded solely on \science" while opponents of its policies are
motivated purely by politics or ideology is not convincing. These early policy statements and internal doc-
uments provide strong evidence that FDA's regulatory decisions were heavily inuenced by political and
economic pressures to foster the development of the biotechnology industry. Of course, only committed
idealists would believe that government agencies are motivated solely by non-political considerations. Never-
theless, the FDA's steadfast refusal to acknowledge that it's biotech policy was motivated by anything other
than sound science and its accusations that its opponents are guided by ideology ring especially disingenuous
in light of this evidence. Moreover, this disconnect between the FDA's public statements and its private
internal memoranda ultimately only serve to undermine the agency's credibility, and foster conspiracy-type
theories of agency capture.
33551 Fed. Reg. at 23303.
70D. Segregation answers:
Finally, although it is true that the system of segregation of GM crops from traditionally derived crops will
probably be an inevitable outgrowth of a labeling system, such a system for segregation of various genetically
engineered products probably should develop even in the absence of mandatory labeling. The recent contro-
versy over StarLink demonstrates the extent to which genetic engineering techniques, even in the absence of
labeling, necessitates a more sophisticated food handling system than the traditional model. The StarLink
issue rst came to light last year when Starlink, a genetically engineered corn strain not approved for hu-
man consumption due to concerns about allergenicity,336 was nevertheless found in foods in grocery stores.
The controversy eventually lead to a nationwide recall of more than 300 varieties of foods, including corn
chips and taco shells.337 Despite that dramatic controversy, recent tests have conrmed that the genetically
modied strain is still being found in seeds intended for sale.338 The continuing problems would seem to
suggest that current food handling mechanisms are simply inadequate: \Agricultural ocials said today that
although it was unclear how the seed became tainted, many suspected cross pollination. Keeping StarLink
segregated|eld to factory to consumer|from corn that is meant for human consumption has proved di-
cult."339 Moreover, these diculties in ensuring that the separating genetically engineered foods may make
it dicult for U.S. food producers to export internationally.340 Thus, even without a mandatory labeling
system, the current system is not even protecting consumers from foods that have not been approved for use
as human food. Regardless of changes FDA labeling policy, the food handling system needs to be adapted
in order to avoid such contamination of the food supply.
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71European mandatory labeling requirements may force segregation of genetically engineered crops grown
in the United States. In fact, Deutch bank has predicted the emergence of a \a two tier market system
...with non-GM organisms the more desirable, and thus more valuable, commodity. Indeed, one of the
largest traders in corn and soybeans, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) in Decatur, Illinois, started oering
farmers a premium of 18 cents per bushel for non-GM soybeans this spring."341 Thus, the market, perhaps
prodded by European regulations, may force the farmers to segregate crops, regardless of whether or not
the FDA imposes mandatory labeling requirement. Moreover, agricultural biotechnology rms may also
voluntarily segregate their products from other products for marketing purposes, particularly producers of
non-grain foods. For example, the Flavr Savr tomato was kept apart from traditional varieties for marketing
purposes.342 As the demand for segregation has increased, technology has been developed to test foods for
contamination by genetically modied varieties. Scientists have developed extremely sensitive tests to screen
both soy and corn for traces of genetically engineered products.343 Just as the testing technology has evolved
to accommodate the demand for labeling overseas, the food commodity system may likewise naturally evolve
in order to accommodate these concerns.
In addition, although the segregation and testing of foods will increase the costs of food production, those
costs will probably be born by middlemen rather than by consumers.344 At least one genetically engineered
food producer, Unilever, [has] expressed a willingness to absorb that short term loss in order to convince
consumers of the desirability of their products."345 Of course, producers unwilling to undergo segregation
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72could simply label their products with the label \may contain genetically modied ingredients." Of course,
these are complicated business judgments that will be dicult to make, but the fact that regulation may
require food producers to make dicult business decisions is not sucient justication for abandoning
regulation altogether. Ultimately, protecting producers from the whims of consumer preferences is simply
not a legitimate basis for sidestepping regulation.
V. Anticipated Public Reaction to Biotechnology Risks.
Although the government has not explicitly made this argument, the opposition to mandatory labeling seems
to be motivated by a desire to prevent consumer panic when regarding labels on genetically engineered foods.
The FDA does not explicitly state this reasoning in explaining its labeling stance; nevertheless, there are
several reasons to believe that the FDA may be motivated by this desire to avoid customer overreaction or
confusion. First, the FDA's own statements indicate the desire to ensure consumer acceptance of genetically
modied foods, and the success of the agricultultural biotechnology industry in the United States. To the
extent that labeling might pose an obstacle to that success, mandatory labeling might be generally disfavored.
Second, the FDA's recent change of course in the irradiation labeling context indicates the extent to which
the FDA has recently been sensitized to concerns about the potential for consumer overreaction to labeling.
Third, there is solid evidence indicating that agricultural biotechnology raises the possibility of precisely the
kinds of risks to which consumers are most sensitive. This sensitivity to consumer reaction may be the main
concern driving the FDA reticence towards adopting a labeling policy. In the recent public forum on labeling
of genetically engineered foods, L. Robert Lake, the agency's Director of Regulations and Policy cautioned
that \it is possible to put truthful information on a label in a way that causes consumers to draw a conclusion
that is false...it is a constant challenge to the Food and Drug Administration in our enforcement activities
73to try to assure that labeling statements, as they are commonly understood, will not mislead consumers."346
This statement demonstrates a particular FDA concern about how customers will interpret labeling.347 This
argument also implicitly acknowledges that \science" and scientic data is not the sole factor determining
FDA's labeling policy.
Most American agricultural biotechnology supporters oppose labeling precisely because of their fear of how
consumers would react to such labeling. For the biotech industry, the greatest fear is that any labeling
would be \interpreted by consumers as a skull and crossbones."348 Even if consumers do not respond that
dramatically, biotech producers are acutely aware that labeling may \increase public anxiety"349 about the
technology being applied to their foods.
In fact, research on public risk perception conrms that consumers are especially likely to overestimate the
particular types of risks that agricultural biotechnology raises. For instance, public risk perception is often
subject to an alarmist bias whereby people are more likely to remember and react to distressing information
than to reassuring information.350 Under the alarmist bias, \the worst possible scenarios loom large in
people's minds, distorting their risk perceptions and behaviors."351 This alarmist bias is likely to interact
with the availability heuristic, whereby the \perceived likelihood of any given event is tied to the ease with
which its occurrence can be brought to mind."352 In fact, \[c]ognitive psychologists consider the availability
heuristic to be a key determinant of individual judgment and perception. They have demonstrated the
346Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond, supra note 22 at 136.
347Mr. Lake demonstrated a similar interest in customer interpretation of labeling statements in stating, \voluntary labeling
raises the challenge of what is the message that the label is intended to convey to customers; also raises the question of what
the consumer's interpretation of the words on the label are going to be" Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond, supra
note 22 at 136.
348Andrew Pollack, FDA Plans New Scrutiny in Ares of Biotechnology, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2001, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/18/health/18REGS.html>>.
349Henry I. Miller, A Rational Approach to Labeling Biotech-Derived Foods, 284 Science 1471 (May 28, 1999), available at
<http://www.sciencemag.org>.
350Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. Penn. L.Rev. 613,
627 (1999). (\frightening information is more salient and potent than comforting information, regardless of what is true")
351Tim Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev 683, at 706 (1999)
352Tim Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev 683, at 685 (1999)
74probability assessments we make as individuals are frequently based on the ease with which we can think
of relevant examples."353 Thus, not only are people likely to remember alarming information, but they are
also more likely to believe such alarming scenarios to be more probable than they actually are. The more
that these disastrous scenarios enter into the public discourse, people are even more likely to overestimate
the likelihood of such scenarios. 354
Given the fact that people are much more likely to believe and act on the alarming information about the
risks of agricultural biotechnology rather than the potential benets of such technology, the industry neces-
sarily has an interest in keeping the public discourse about the technology to a minimum. Consumers are
likely to nd alarming information about the risks of biotechnology more salient and believable than reas-
suring information about the benets. Moreover, the risks of biotechnology have generally been portrayed
in the media in particularly salient ways|with headline grabbing phrases describing genetically engineered
products \frankenfoods."355 This type of information is especially dicult for the biotech industry to coun-
teract with statistical information about the safety of biotech food because \vivid and personal information
will often be more eective than statistical evidence...people will tend to respond to it by attaching a higher
probability to the event in question."356 Moreover, discourse that eectively links the risks of biotech foods
to other well-recognized risks or disasters are likely to be especially eective in alarming consumers about
risks.357 The more vivid the analogy, the more likely readers are to overestimate the risk of the underlying
353Tim Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev 683, at 685 (1999), citing
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bias in Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
354Tim Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev 683, at 285 (1999) (describing
the availability cascade whereby \expressed perceptions trigger chains of individual responses that make these perceptions
appear increasingly plausible through their rising availability in public discourse"). This hypothesis was conrmed by a recent
study of public perception of agricultural biotechnology in Europe and the United States. The study found that negative public
perceptions of genetically engineered foods correlated with the amount of press coverage, not the nature of the coverage. Gaskell
et. al., Worlds Apart: The Reception of Genetically Modied Foods in Europe and the U.S. (5/7). Thus, although the study
found the coverage in the European press to be generally more favorable than the coverage in the U.S., Europeans were still
generally more wary of genetically engineered foods than their American counterparts.
355See, e.g., Matthew Franken, Fear of Frankenfoods: A Better Labeling Standard for Genetically Modied Foods, 1 Minn.
Intell. Prop. Rev. 153 (2000)
356Christine Jolls etal., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1537 (1998).
357Kuran and Sunstein describe the \anchoring eect" whereby \[p]eople who heard Love Canal characterized as a disaster
75activity.358
Moreover, the public is likely to be especially sensitive to the particular types of risks raised by agricultural
biotechnology. For instance, one commonly recognized factor aecting risk perception is the controllability
eect whereby a risk is discounted to the extent that an individual believes that he or she has the ability
to control that risk.359 The classic illustration of this eect is the fact that people are generally much more
concerned about the risks associated with ying with the risks associated with driving because of their belief
that they have more control the risks attendant with driving.360 At least part of the concern driving the
push for mandatory labeling is this desire to have information as a way to control risk exposure. Consumers
may be especially worried about the use of agricultural biotechnology in a world without labeling because
they have no control over their exposure to this relatively new agricultural technique. This lack of control
over exposure to a particular risk probably heightens any reservations they might otherwise have about the
technology. Ironically, this heightened concern has probably not been exhibited thus far precisely because
consumers are not aware of the extent to which biotech foods have entered the food stream.
Public tolerance of a particularly risk is often aected not only by the public's perception of the likelihood
of a particular risk, but also by the particular characteristics of that risk. For instance, the public is par-
ticularly sensitive to risks that are \potentially catastrophic, likely to aect future generations, inequitably
akin to the Vietnam War, or as an ocial act of mass murder, tended to consider the risk more serious than dispassionate
analysis of the scientic data would suggest. In other words, they underdiscounted the analogy, thus becoming overly alarmed
by the revealed evidence." Tim Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev 683,
at 732 (1999)
358In fact, Kuran and Sunstein describe how \availability entrepreneurs" may emerge among \[s]ocial agents who understand
the dynamics of availability cascades and seek to exploit their insights may be characterized as availability entrepreneurs.
Located anywhere in the social system, including the government, the media, nonprot organizations, the business sector, and
even households, these entrepreneurs attempt to trigger availability cascades likely to advance their own agendas. They do
so by xing people's attention on specic problems, interpreting phenomena in particular ways, and attempting to raise the
salience of certain information." Kuran and Sunstein at 687.\[E]ven when cognitive deception is involved availability cascades
may serve a socially benecial purpose. Indeed, the entrepreneurs who set them in motion may well be exploiting heuristic
devices as a response to private ignorance and public apathy." Tim Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, at 735 (1999).
359Id. at 708.
360Id. at 708.
76distributed, or involuntarily incurred,"361 and less concerned about risks with \natural origins or unidenti-
able victims."362 Kuran and Sunstein have identied risk characteristics that are likely to aect the public's
willingness to accept a particular risk. Interestingly, of the fteen factors they identied as damaging the
public's willingness to accept a particular risk, eleven arguably apply in the agricultural biotechnology con-
text. Among these applicable aggravating risk factors are \new/relatively unfamiliar risk, inability to control
the risk personally, involuntariness in exposure, heavy media coverage, evenly distributed risk; children at
special risk; future generations at risk; possibility of irreversible risks; risk derived from human generated
source; low trust in institutions; and the underlying mechanisms of the source of the risk are poorly under-
stood."363
It is striking that so many of these aggravating factors characterize agricultural biotechnology. The technol-
ogy clearly represents a new development in the food supply; consumers are not currently able to regulate
when and how they are exposed to foods containing genetically engineered ingredients; there has been pretty
heavy media coverage of biotechnology generally; the eects of this technology are pretty evenly distributed
because food aects everyone; children may be put at special risk; the environmental eects may aect future
generations; doomsayers predict irreversible damages; the technology clearly comes from a human derived
source; the public has exhibited decreasing trust in government agencies generally; and people generally do
not understand all of the technology driving genetically engineered foods.
The negative impact of these factors on the public's willingness to accept a risk makes intuitive sense. For
instance, consider the familiarity factor. It makes intuitive sense that accidents that occur with respect to
unfamiliar technology, such as nuclear power, are likely to produce much more widespread social unease than
accidents that occur with respect to a familiar technology, such as car or train accidents, because accidents
in these new technologies are much more likely to be \perceived as a harbinger of future and possible catas-




In addition, the public has exhibited a willingness to \tolerate higher risks from activities seen as highly
benecial" suggesting that the public undergoes an informal type of risk benet analysis when deciding the
acceptability of a particular risk.365 However, this factor that does no benet the agricultural biotechnology
industry since the major benets from their products accrue to farmers rather than to consumers.
Finally, the public is generally risk (loss) averse.366 That is, people tend to weigh losses more heavily than
gains. Accordingly, the public tends to \evaluate outcomes based on the change they represent from an
initial reference point, rather than based on the nature of the outcome itself; also, losses from the initial
reference point are weighted much more heavily than gains."367 Moreover, \a perceived threat of a loss
relative to the status quo weighs more heavily than a perceived threat of foregoing a gain."368 In the context
of genetically engineered foods, consumers are likely to weigh the benets of the technology against the
benets of the agricultural products they are currently familiar with. This risk benet analysis will weigh
even more heavily against genetically engineered foods because consumers do not derive any direct benet
the genetically engineered products currently on the market. Moreover, all other things being equal, they
are likely to favor the status quo, even at the potential cost of foregoing benets of biotechnology rather
than take a perceived risk. Accordingly, consumers are likely to be more concerned about the possible risks
of biotechnology than they are to be concerned about the possibility of foregoing the benets that might
be brought about from the use of agricultural biotechnology. This consumer conservatism about food in
particular is conrmed in the rhetoric that suggests that food is a special commodity that consumers have
a particular relationship with food.369
364Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280, 284 (Apr. 17, 1987).
365Id. at 283.




78Given these basic cognitive biases in the perception of risk, it is not surprising that the biotechnology indus-
try is not eager to start a full ung debate on the merits of biotechnology. These studies strongly suggest that
consumers are likely to be particularly wary of agricultural biotechnology and to be particularly concerned
about the particular kinds of risk that the technology can pose. This basic conservatism is reected in the
available consumer data. Moreover, the data also indicates that it is extremely dicult to change people's
initial risk perceptions once they are formed. People are likely to view evidence that contradicts their beliefs
as untrustworthy.370 Thus, the biotechnology industry, and an FDA that strongly believes that the risks
of biotechnology strongly outweigh its benets, will inevitably have a hard time convincing the consuming
public of the safety of these foods if the public is already predisposed to view such foods as potentially
hazardous.
Given this data, the FDA may worry that mandatory labeling would be unwarranted, and even harmful in
this case. It may worry about the fact that in most contexts mandatory labels are associated with products
posing potential hazards or health risks (i.e. cigarette labeling), not safe products. 371 Thus, arguably,
a non-mandatory labeling policy helps to avoid consumer confusion and unwarranted apprehension about
foods containing genetically modied food ingredients.372 The FDA's irradiation policy modication pro-
posal indicates the extent to which the FDA seems to be concerned about the possibility that informational
labeling might be interpreted by consumers as warning labels. For instance, the FDA's specically requested
comments on how the radiation label is publicly perceived (\as informational, as a warning, or as something
else"?), and on whether the current label elicits \inappropriate anxiety."373
370Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280, 281 (Apr. 17, 1987). (\New evidence appears reliable and informative
if it is consistent with one's initial beliefs; contrary evidence tends to be dismissed as unreliable, erroneous, or unrepresenta-
tive. When people lack strong prior opinions, the opposite situation exists|they are at the mercy of the problem formation.
Presenting the same information about risk in dierent ways (for example, mortality rates as opposed to survival rates) alters
people's perceptions and actions")
371Matthew Franken, Comment, Fear of Frankenfoods: A Better Labeling Standard for Genetically Modied Foods, 1 Minn.
Intell. Prop. Rev. 153, 170 (2000).
372Id. at 170.
37364 Fed. Reg. at 7837
79B. It is hard to provide information without giving a judgment.
One of the fundamental problems animating this debate is that proponents of labeling portray a biotech-
nology label as simply informational, whereas biotech proponents generally indicate that such a label would
inevitably be viewed as a warning label. Unfortunately, no label is purely informational. The FDA is proba-
bly concerned that any label will be interpreted as by consumers as a signal that agricultural biotechnology
is a process that consumers should be aware of, in the same way that requiring food producers to print
information about fat and nutrient content on labeling is a subtle signal that consumers should be aware of
information about fat and nutrients.
Labels, even though primarily meant to be informational and to give consumers the opportunity to make
independent choices, can never present information in a purely neutral way.374 In fact, the one legal com-
mentator has stated that \in the real world, she who provides information ends up giving advice."375 It
is plausible that the FDA is concerned that a mandatory label would signal to consumers that the FDA is
advising an increased level of precaution with respect to genetically engineered foods. Although labeling is
seemingly a simple solution to the problem of consumer ignorance, communication about this or any other
complex risk issue \necessitates walking a ne line separating facilitation and manipulation."376 While there
is a legitimate interest in facilitating consumer choice, the government should be wary of taking regulatory
steps that may subtly inuence or shape the choices that consumers make.377 Any law mandating disclosure
necessarily confronts \a general tension in regulatory policy between consumer sovereignty and consumer
protection."378 Given this framework, it is not surprising that the FDA, viewing its mission as primarily one
of consumer protection,379 would consider the \consumer sovereignty" issue as secondary in this context.
374Jolls et al, supra note 366 at 1534. (\there is often no `neutral' way to present information")
375Jolls, et al., supra note 366 at 1435.
376Sage, supra note 112at 1730.
377Sage, supra note 112 at 1730.
378Sage, supra note 112 at 1821.
379Food and Drug Administration, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, FDA Consumer, June 1981, available at
<<http://www.vm.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/histor1b.html>>.
80Nevertheless, despite FDA's legitimate concerns about how a label might be perceived by the public, coun-
tervailing considerations should take precedence over these concerns. First, consumers may be much less
likely to \overreact" to this labeling information in a food context than other products. After all, consumers
are accustomed to all kinds of mandatory labeling on their food, and the information required on the label
is generally not information that would be construed as warning statement. In such a context where con-
sumers are accustomed to multiple labeling requirements,380 consumers may not inevitably perceive all new
information on the label as an indicator of a hazard or danger. If genetic engineering labeling actually did
cause consumer anxiety, it is arguably just as likely that consumer anxiety is triggered by knowledge of the
presence of the genetically engineered ingredients, rather than by the fact that those ingredients are labeled.
C. Our current method of risk analysis is awed:
The heart of the consumer overreaction argument is that the public is likely perceive the risk of this technol-
ogy to be much higher than the scientists. However, the research literature indicates that even the scientists
are not really sure of the extent of the risks of biotechnology. A recent article published in Science magazine
by L.L. Wolfenbarger and P.R. Phifer noted that \key experiments on both the environmental risks and
benets are lacking."381 Thus, consumer expression of concern about the presence of genetically engineered
products in their food should not be automatically dismissed as \overreaction" since scientists themselves
have not determined the extent of the risk posed by these products.
1.
380Including labeling about whether the potatoes in their potato chips were dehydrated before processing. See 208 Fed. Reg
at 13388.
381L.L. Wolfenbarger & P.R. Phifer, The Ecological Risks and Benets of Genetically Engineered Plants, 290 Science 2088,
2088 (Dec. 15, 2000).
81Pro biotech arguments tend to engage in an inconsistent type of risk
benet analysis.
Although the evidence suggests that consumers are likely to be much more concerned about the risks posed by
agricultural biotechnology than scientists, arguably the risk-benet analysis as presented by biotechnology
proponents is also systematically skewed. For instance, proponents often argue that risks of agricultural
biotechnology are far outweighed by the potential for the technology to save the environment, feed the
hungry, and help people to stave o dangerous diseases.382 However, even those genetically engineered foods
touted for their \humanitarian" benets may have been over-promoted by the biotechnology industry. For
instance, Golden Rice, a genetically modied rice altered to contain increased amounts of vitamin A has
been promoted as a solution to blindness and other illnesses related to vitamin A deciency.383 Nevertheless,
scientists have recently pointed out that \the widely vaunted health benets of the rice are likely to elude the
poorest people who eat it,"384 because the enhanced levels of vitamin A will be of no nutritional benet to
people whose diets do not contain sucient levels of fats necessary for their bodies to absorb the vitamin.385
Even more problematic are arguments that seem to be promoting the potential benets of the most appealing
types of genetic modications (i.e. the Golden Rice variety) in order to advance the acceptance of other,
unrelated genetically engineered foods. Thus, the potential of genetically engineered foods designed prevent
blindness have been advanced in order to advocate the acceptance of genetically modied organisms with
much less demonstrably humanitarian benets|in fact, very few benets for consumers at all.386 This
type of argument is demonstrated by Clive James, Chairman of ISAAA, a not-for-prot agency [created to
alleviate hunger in the Third World by facilitating the transfer of crop biotech applications] at Cornell who
382Glickman Address, supra note ??.
383Critics claim `Sight Saving' Rice is Over-rated, 410 Nature 503 (2001)
384Critics claim `Sight Saving' Rice is Over-rated, 410 Nature 503 (2001).
385Id.
386Who's Afraid?, Economist, June 17, 1999, available at <http://www.economist.com>. (\companies still pitch their prod-
ucts as a cure for malnutrition, even though little that they are doing can justify such a noble claim.")
82has stated,
The most compelling [argument] for biotechnology is its potential contribution to global food security
and the alleviation of hunger in the third world...It is important that the U.S. maintain [their]
commitment to GM crops. In the absence of continued U.S. leadership, developing countries would
be denied the opportunity to source U.S. technologies in their quest for food security and condemn up
to a billion people in the Third World to unnecessary and unacceptable suering from malnutrition,
hunger and poverty.387
In response to such arguments, biotech critics charge that the biotech producers are \using the poor to
justify selling their products to the rich"388 and point out that \the industry concentrates on crops like
herbicide-resistant soybeans for farmers in the Midwest, not drought tolerant millet for subsistence farmers
in Africa."389
Of course, this form of argument is inconsistent with another of the biotech food industry's fundamental
claims. If genetically engineered foods really are not fundamentally dierent from their conventional coun-
terparts, then the risks and benets of each individual food product must be weighed individually. Thus, the
consumer risks of Bt corn should be weighed solely against the consumer benets of Bt corn. Of course, any
unknown risk of an individual food product would be extremely hard to outweigh against the prospect of
\feeding the world" as it has been speculated that bioengineering technology is capable of. But no one has
argued that Bt corn holds the key to solving world hunger. Just as any other traditionally developed food
product, bioengineered foods should stand or fall on their own merits. For instance, we would never argue
that non-genetically modied apples that pose potential health environmental risks should be allowed on the
market based on the health benets of oranges or other non-genetically modied products. Each product
should be evaluated separately for purposes of risk-benet analysis.390 Wolfenbarger and Phifer noted that
388Andrew Pollack, Critics of Biotechnology are Called Imperialists, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/04/weekinreview/04POLL.html>.
389Id.
390The EU-U.S. Biotechnology Consultative Forum, Final Report, December 2000, 11, available at
83\[n]either the risks nor the benets of GEOs are certain or universal. Both may vary spatially and on a
case-by-case basis."391 Accordingly, it is only appropriate to weigh the benets of any particular genetically
engineered crop against the risks of that same crop, at least to the extent that these factors are known.
In addition, the risk benet analysis should also compare of the relative risks and benets of foods produced
through genetic engineering techniques with similar foods produced through conventional and organic farm-
ing techniques.392 Thus, the risks and benets of Bt corn should be compared with the risks and benets of
conventionally derived corn, and organically grown corn.
2.
Scientists and lay people have dierent conceptions of risk.
All dierences in risk perception between lay consumers and scientists should not necessarily be interpreted
as evidence that consumers are not rational enough to handle risk information. Much of the current debate
over risk perception often portrays scientists' risk perception as \objective, analytic, wise and rational|
based on real risks," [emphasis in original]393 whereas the risk perception of the lay public is depicted as
\subjective, often hypothetical, emotional, foolish and irrational."394 Thus, arguments against labeling often
hinge on an assumption that the public cannot rationally assess the risks of genetically engineered foods,
and argue that labeling would actually be \counterproductive" by raising unnecessary consumer fears.395
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/us/biotech/report.pdf>. [hereinafter Final Report ](\We recom-
mend that once the basic threshold of human safety has been met it is also appropriate to consider, on a case-by-case basis,
the potential risks and benets of each new product given the health and nutritional status of the people and the ecological
and agricultural systems in a particular region of use.") Of course, risk-benet calculations are not appropriate in any case
until \the basic threshold of reasonable certainty of no harm to human health has been reached." Id.
391Wolfenbarger & Phifer, supra note 381 at 2092.
392Wolfenbarger & Phifer supra note 381 at p 2092.
393Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment Battleeld, 1997 U. Chi. Legal.
F. 59, 60 (1997) [hereinafter Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics].
394Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, supra note 393, at 60.
395Miller, supra note 147.
84However, given the fact that both scientists and the lay public are making risk predictions where there is
very little actual data about those risks,396 it is not altogether clear that one assessment is more rational
than another.
Rather, scientists and the public simply think about the risk in general, and the risks of agricultural biotech-
nology in particular, in radically dierent ways. For instance, Dr. Steven Kresovich, a plant breeder at
Cornell, in attempting to counter public concern about the perceived potential hazards of agricultural
biotechnology argued that \[g]enes should be characterized by function, not origin. It's not a ounder gene
but a cold tolerance gene that was introduced into strawberries [through agricultural biotechnology]."397
Nevertheless, although the scientists may think of this gene as simply a \cold tolerance gene," the lay public
is much more likely to think of the gene as a \ounder gene"|raising public concerns about breaching the
order of nature.398 Although the scientist clearly thinks that the gene is more accurately characterized as a
\cold tolerance gene" than as a ounder gene, both views are actually accurate. They simply illustrate two
dierent ways of looking at the same problem, with neither view demonstrably more true or accurate than the
other than the other. Although the gene genuinely does serve a particular function in an organism{allowing
the plant to withstand cold{it is equally undeniable that the gene originally came from ounder. These
dierent perspectives on the same facts can occur even within the scientic community. Monsanto and other
agriculture biotech companies are likely to see themselves as the Microsoft of the new agriculture|with the
process of biotechnology analogized to programming computers.399 However, other scientists are likely to see
plants not as computers but as tiny complex, not fully understood, ecosystems, not as computer programs
whose manipulations oer predictable, stable results.400 The important point is that both of these analogies
396Wolfenbarger & Phifer, supra note 381.
397Jane E. Brody, Gene Altered Foods: A Case Against Panic, N.Y. Times, December 5, 2000, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/05/science/05BROD.html?printpage=yes>
398Prince Charles in England has written a column arguing that biotechnology \takes mankind into realms that belong to
God and to God alone." Playing God in the Garden,supra note 3.
399Playing God in the Garden, supra note 3.
400Playing God in the Garden, supra note 3. In responding to Monsanto's software metaphor, Richard Lewontin, a geneticist
85oer descriptive power, but neither analogy has a lock on the truth.
The concept of risk itself is hardly neutral.401 Any risk assessment is likely to reect the values of the
assessor, and scientists and the public often start with dierent belief systems and world-views.402 Scien-
tists and risk experts tend to judge risk according to a single dimension{technical, statistical data regarding
human fatalities.403 The public, on the other hand, is more likely to judge risk according to the qualities
of the risk posed, for instance, possible impacts of a risk, whether the risk might impact future generations,
etc. Interestingly, the public can often somewhat accurately estimate the kinds of annual fatalities statistics
that scientists generally rely on for their risk assessments; but nevertheless, the public systematically prefer
certain kinds of risks over others, regardless of the annual fatalities statistics.404 These ndings suggest that
the public simply prefers certain kinds of risks over others, regardless of their probabilities. Moreover, any
strict dichotomy between science and ideology is a false one. Any individual's position on the issues raised
by biotechnology are likely to be inuenced by both scientic evidence, and their political beliefs. In fact,
one's view towards scientic evidence is likely to be inuenced by one's ideological framework.
The risk assessments of scientists are likewise inuenced by a myriad of subjective factors.405 Although
scientists undoubtedly strive to minimize the inuence of subjective factors on their results, such factors
occasionally creep into their ultimate risk assessments. Scientists' risk assessments are most likely to be in-
at Harvard argued that the analogy was not particularly descriptive of the actual biotechnological process itself. He argued
that the analogy is not accurate because \`[i]t implies you feed a program into a machine and get predictable results. Bu the
genome is very noisy. If my computer made as many mistakes as an organism does"|in interpreting its DNA, he meant|\I'd
throw it out"' Id. In oering the ecosystem metaphor, he explained that \You can always intervene and change something in
it [a plant's genetic makeup], but there's no way of knowing what all the downstream eects will be or how it might aect
the environment. We have such a miserably poor understanding of how the organism develops from its DNA that I would be
surprised if we don't get one rude shock after another."' Id.
401Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280, 283 (Apr. 17, 1987).
402Derek Burke, Time for Voices to be Raised, 405 Nature 509 (2000), available at <http://www.nature.com>.
403Slovic, supra note 401 at 283.
404Slovic, supra note 401 at 283.
405See Trust Emotion, Sex, Politics, supra note 393 at 83 (\Aect and worldviews seem to inuence the risk-related judgments
of scientists, as well as laypersons"). See, e.g., id. at 63. (\One way in which subjectivity permeates risk assessments is in
the dependence of such assessments on judgments at every stage of the process, from the initial structuring of a risk problem
to deciding which endpoints or consequences to include in the analysis, identifying and estimating exposures, choosing dose-
response relationships, and so on. For example, even the apparently simple tasks of choosing a risk measure for a well-dened
endpoint such as human fatalities is surprisingly complex and judgmental.")
86uenced by their own worldviews and value systems when they are \working at the limits of their expertise."
406 Thus, when scientists have the least hard data, as in the case of genetically engineered plants, their
risk assessments are most likely to be inuenced by subjective factors.407 Moreover, American scientists
in particular may have personal, professional interests in the success of the technology; Dr. Goldberg has
pointed out that \biotechnology is the baby of the U.S. scientic community and...scientists in this country
have all sorts of interest in its development."408 Additionally, just as the public's risk assessment reect a
inclination in favor of protecting future generations, the scientic community's risk assessments may reect
a inclination to view scientic advances as benecial,409 particularly when they have invested their careers
in this technology.
The public's aversion to particular kinds of risks does not reect irrationality but public values. In fact,
a study of public attitudes towards agricultural biotechnology suggested that \respondents with concerns
about gene technology tended to think principally in terms of moral acceptability rather than risk|a sig-
nicant dierence from the way in which experts normally judge the acceptability of new technologies."410
These non-risk factors should also be taken into account in setting policy. A bias in favor of protecting future
generations against technologies with catastrophic potential such as nuclear power, or against technologies
presenting risks to particularly vulnerable populations such as children or the elderly reect public values
that are properly involved in public policy decisions. Ultimately, all public policy decisions rely on evidence
and judgment, not scientic evidence alone.411 This is especially true with respect to the genetic engineering
debate, since the scientic data have not established the risks and benets of this technology to any degree
406Trust, Emotion, Sex. Politics, supra note 393 at 95.
407Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280, 281 (Apr. 17, 1987) (\[e]xperts' judgments appear to be prone to many of the
same biases as those of the general public, particularly when experts are forced to go beyond the limits of available data and
rely on intuition.")
408Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond, supra note 22 at 63.
409Derek Burke, Time for Voices to be Raised, 405 Nature 509 (2000), available at <http://www.nature.com>.
410George Gaskell et al., Worlds Apart? The Reception of Genetically Modied Foods in Europe and the U.S., 285 Science
384 (July 16, 1999), available at <http://www.sciencemag.org>.
411Derek Burke, Time for Voices to be Raised, 405 Nature 509 (2000), available at <http://www.nature.com>.
87of certainty.412
Although risk decisions should be informed by the most accurate scientic data possible, it is also legitimate
to allow public judgments about risk acceptability to inform public regulation.413 Democratic governments
properly seek on accurate and science-based risk assessments, but it is also eminently proper for such a
government to also regulate in such a way to reect the public's risk preferences.414 Although scientic data
is a critical part of the decisionmaking process, science alone does not oer any clear solutions. Moreover,
even a risk deemed to be low does not mean that the technology is necessarily desirable; policy makers must
still balance \options, benets, and other costs|not just risk"415 in order to come to a proper result. Thus,
even if a particular genetically engineered product is deemed to present a low risk of health or environmental
harms, a full benet analysis should also include a comparison with the non-genetically engineered variety
of the same product. In other words, even if the product presents low risks, it is only socially desirable if it
presents lower risks and or more benets than the products already on the market. Interestingly, although
science has found a relatively objective measure of risk (annual fatalities), it is less clear what standard the
scientic community would use in order to measure benets. Ultimately, only the public can decide the
desirability of particular benets.
The purchasing public is likely to take a \hazard model" approach towards agricultural biotechnology based
on the public's experiences with other recent technological changes in food production.416 Drawing on their
experience with such modern food processing techniques the use of pesticides, growth hormones, the use
of antibiotics in animal husbandry, the public is generally skeptical that the use of these innovations really
412\Neither the risks nor the benets of GEOs are certain or universal. Both may vary spacially and temporally on a case-
by-case basis. Comparisons among transgenic, conventional, and other agricultural practices, such as organic farming, will
elucidate the relative risks and benets of adopting GEOs." L.L. Wolfenbarger & P.R. Phifer, The Ecological Risks and
Benets of Genetically Engineered Plants, 290 Science 2088, 2092 (Dec. 15, 2000).
413Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 361 at 738.
414Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 361 at 738.
415Trust Emotion Sex, Politics, supra note 393 at 96.
416Consumer Focus Groups, supra note 5 at 3.
88advantage for consumers in any way.417 Instead, \[i]n each case, participants saw a technological innovation
that was introduced mainly for the sake of producers/distributors, with little apparent benet to the con-
sumer. Such innovations are seen as being approved by scientists and regulators, but later found to have
unanticipated long-term health eects."418 In this case the public intuition that the biotechnology products
on the market were not really put on the market to appeal to their needs is correct.419
Biotech companies interested in gaining consumer acceptance of their products should take note that the
public is fully aware that biotech products were not designed to suit their needs or interests. From the
perspective of the public, any perceived benets of the technology are also likely to aect both sides of
the equation; perceived benets aect both their assessment of the risks of the technology as well as their
assessment of the benets of the technology. Thus a \higher perceived benet is associated with lower per-
ceived risk; lower perceived benet is associated with higher perceived risk."420 The public's assessment of
a product's risks and benets are keyed primarily to their \aective evaluation," or emotional response, to
that product.421 For instance, cars{generally seen as extremely socially desirable{are perceived as a oer-
ing high benets and posing relative low risk technology whereas pesticides{with a much lower \aective
evaluation"{are generally perceived as presenting high risks, for relatively low benet.422
A comparison of public attitudes towards pharmaceutical biotechnology and agricultural biotechnology con-
rms that customers are much more willing to accept a new technology if it oers them tangible benets.
In the case of pharmaceutical biotechnology, people are much more accepting of any potential risks partly
417Consumer Focus Groups, supra note 5 at 3.
418Consumer Focus Groups, supra note 5 at 3.
419Who's Afraid, Economist, June 17, 1999, available at <http://www.economist.com>. (\the clearest gains from the current
crop of GM plants go not to consumers, but to producers. Indeed, that was what their developers intended; an appeal to farmers
oered the purveyors of GM technology the best hope of a speedy return. For consumers, especially in the rich world, the
benets of super-yielding soybeans are less clear: the world, by and large, already has too much food in its stores; developing
countries principally lack money, not food as such."). According to Carol Tucker Foreman, \none of [the GM foods] that have
been developed yet have any benet to the consuming public. We keep hearing that there are those in the pipeline that will,
but they are way back in the pipeline, way, way back" Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond, supra note 22 at 119.
420Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, supra note 393 at 81.
421Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, supra note 393at 81. (\It thus appears that the aective response is primary, and the risks
and benet judgments are derived (at least partly) from it")
422Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, supra note 393 at 81.
89because the benets of improved drugs and better diagnostic techniques; however, agricultural biotechnol-
ogy, which does not oer any such noticeable concrete benets to the public, is viewed with considerably
more suspicion.423 This tendency to overlook risks when a product is deemed socially benecial suggests
that agricultural biotechnology's best hope of public acceptance lies in its ability to create products that
customers actually prefer to conventionally derived products. The best way to gain consumer acceptance
of agricultural biotechnology is not to withhold information about the use of the technology, but to use
the technology to produce product traits that are valued by consumers. Thus, the evidence about public
perception of risks does not provide the biotechnology companies with all bad news. However, in order to
use this information to gain public acceptance of their products, the biotechnology companies, like all other
companies, must be willing to change their marketing strategies to suit customer preferences.
Of course, some of the cognitive biases and phenomenon discussed{such as availability cascades, and the
alarmist bias{do not involve risk preferences, but actual cognitive distortions of the probability of a risk.
Nevertheless, these cognitive distortions are not unique to the agricultural biotechnology context. Any demo-
cratically informed public policy debate over risks will be informed by these cognitive distortions. Ultimately,
the fact that the public may misperceive the probability of a risk does cannot justify a policy designed to keep
the public in the dark about the risk. Any democratically informed debate is, by denition, vulnerable to the
weaknesses and shortcomings of human understanding. However, these distortions in human understanding
do not justify taking people out of the decisionmaking process.
Moreover, this argument is particularly true in the labeling debate. Although the FDA might be justied
in arguing that cognitive distortions should not shape or inuence substantive safety regulations, the debate
over labeling is over whether or not people should be informed about what is in their food. Any argument
423Who's Afraid, Economist, June 17 1999, available at <http://www.economist.com>.
90against labeling based on an attempt to avoid consumer knowledge and consumer overreaction about the risk
of this technology should be viewed with particular suspicion. While it may be proper to limit the extent to
which cognitive distortions inuence the degree of regulation of a particular risk, cognitive distortions should
not be used to justify withholding information from consumers.
C. A Possibility of Public Overreaction Does not Justify Withholding Information.
Even assuming that the public is likely to be especially worried about potential risks posed by genetically
modied foods, a desire to avert public overreaction ultimately cannot suciently justify a decision to keep
information from the public. In 44 Liquormart, Stevens, in an opinion joined by Kennedy and Ginsburg,
stated that \[t]he First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep
people in the dark for what government perceives to be their own good."424 In fact, in Virginia Board
of Pharmacy, the Court stated, \It is a matter of public interest that those [private economic] decisions be
intelligent and well informed."425 Moreover, the Stevens jointed by Kennedy Souter and Guinsburg explained
that the Virginia Board of Pharmacy case rested on the belief that \a State's paternalistic assumption that
the public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial information unwisely cannot justify a decision to
suppress it."426
Although both the 44 Liquormart and Virginia Board of Pharmacy cases involved government suppression of
commercial speech, rather than a government regulation mandating speech, the reasoning in those cases can
be extended to the present context as well. We should be suspicious of the government's refusal to require
labeling to the extent that the government refusal to require such labeling is a desire to avoid consumer
overreaction, and for \the public's own good." Of course, it is possible that the refusal to require labeling
stems simply from a sincere belief that bioengineering is not a \material fact." However, to the extent that
42444 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
425Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
426517 U.S. at 497 (1996)
91the government policy is aimed at avoiding consumer overreaction by keeping information from consumers,
such policy should be viewed skeptically.
In the end, the argument for labeling is based on the fact that people simply do not and cannot realize that so
many of the foods that they are currently eating have genetically engineered products, and that people have
indicated a desire for this kind of information. Moreover, even consumers informed of the extent to which
genetically modied foods have entered the marketplace, currently have no way of knowing whether or not a
particular food product they are purchasing contains genetically engineered ingredients. In this context, any
argument against labeling based on a fear of \consumer overreaction" seems paternalistic at best. After all,
such an argument hinges on the assumption that consumers will nd information about genetic engineering
salient and material. In fact, such a position basically argues that people will nd this information too
salient, and will make irrational purchasing decisions. Nevertheless, the entire market economy rests on the
assumption that consumers should be allowed to make purchasing decisions based on the information they
consider important.
In the end, it is not FDA's responsibility to encourage the growth of a particular industry or technology, no
matter what the potential benets.427 Agency attempts to promote a particular industry raises immediate
questions about agency capture. The biotechnology industry has thus far argued against labeling based on
the conclusion that such labels will raise consumer questions about biotechnology, and make it harder to
sell these products. However, opposition to labeling based on the belief that the market will respond to this
information is especially troubling. Winn has argued that such a desire to keep information o the market
because of a fear of consumer rejection itself should trigger traditional FDA concerns about \intentional
consumer deception."428 After all, the manufacturers are marketing these products with the express hope
427Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51 Fed. Reg. at 13395.
428Winn, supra note 342 at 678. (\Arguably, this is a form of intentional consumer deception, which should suggest to FDA
that genetic engineering information would be rather powerful in the hands of consumers, especially in light of FDA's concerns
about preventing consumer deception. Although FDA does not subscribe to the extreme position that the government is
responsible for regulating everything the public perceives to be a risk, the power of information in consumers should be given
92that consumers will not realize that their products contain genetically modied ingredients.
Agricultural biotechnology food producers should bear the responsibility of gaining consumer acceptance of
their products. This is how the market traditionally works, and the use of a materiality analysis to shield
the manufacturers from their traditional responsibility to convince consumers to purchase their products is
improper. Winn argues,
It is in the best interest of manufacturers to convince consumers of the value of their products. This
is generally how the market works; manufacturers develop a product and convince consumers to
buy that product. The correct response, therefore, to a negative reaction to special labeling, is not
for FDA to withhold labeling requirements. Instead, the correct response is to make manufacturers
responsible for educating consumers, allaying their fears, and instilling their condence in biotech
food.429
While it is true that biotech manufacturers will probably have to face dicult consumer concerns about the
long-term health, allergenic, and environmental eects of these foods, this is not a special burden placed
solely on agricultural biotechnologists. Rather, virtually any producer of a new technology must ultimately
gain acceptance of the public|even when the public is prone to irrational decisionmaking. The airline indus-
try faces especially strict safety regulations even though ying is generally much safer than driving. While
professional risk analysts may question the eciency of such regulations, ultimately those regulations exist
because of public preferences. Moreover, many of the heightened risk preferences triggered by agricultural
biotechnology actually reect public values, not irrationality. Consumers have every right to prefer tradi-
tionally grown food over foods that they are less familiar with. Similarly, the consumer desire to control
exposure to the particular kinds of risks posed by biotechnology, even if those risks are extremely small, is
simply not irrational; this desire simply reects the value that consumers place on their ability to control
as much consideration in the biotech food context as in other areas under FDA regulation")
93when they are facing particular kinds of risks. To the extent that consumer risk preferences reect such
personal values, biotech food companies can do little to change those underlying values.
It was proper for the FDA to consider whether a mandatory label requirement may be perceived as a warning
statement and the potential for the public to be mislead by the implications of such a label. However, the
FDA's analysis stopped one step short. It should also have considered the public's perception of foods that
do not contain labels indicating that ingredients have been genetically modied. Under 21 U.S.C. x 321(n),
a label or lack thereof may be misleading if the labeling \fails to reveal facts...material with respect to
consequences which may result from the use of the article...under such conditions of use as are custom-
ary or usual."430 Accordingly, the omission of labeling information may be misleading under the statute.
Nevertheless, the although the FDA has indicated that it considers how the public might perceive a genetic
engineering label, it does not consider the extent to which the omission of information regarding the genetic
engineering of products is widely perceived. The evidence strongly suggests that foods without the labeling
of genetically engineered ingredients are presumed not to contain such ingredients, since the public is largely
unaware of the presence of these foods in their supermarkets. To the extent that that presumption is incor-




Perhaps sensing the strength of public support for labeling, Monsanto has recently decided to support the
labeling of its bioengineered products in the European Union.431 A Monsanto spokesman framed the re-
43021 U.S.C. x321(n).
431Monsanto Changes Stand on Labeling Genetically Modied Food in European Union, Pesticide and Toxic Chemical
94versal of position as part of a process to gain consumer acceptance of bioengineered products, explaining
that the label represented \a question of transparency, openness, and trust."432 Moreover, reiterating the
company's basic position that bioengineered foods are not essentially dierent from conventional agricultural
products, he stated that \the company has decided [to] ...accept[] the reality that European consumers want
to know when they are purchasing genetically engineered foods."433 Most dramatically, Monsanto's CEO
Robert Shapiro admitted that \[t]he company's attitude had widely been seen, and understandably so, as
condescension or indeed arrogance...Because we thought it was our job to persuade, too often we forgot to
listen."434 In acquiescing to labeling, Monsanto followed the lead of some of its European competitors. For
example, Novartis does not oppose mandatory labeling of GM foods, instead chosing to view labeling as \a
way to show condence...in the safety and quality of [their] products." 435
Monsanto's change in position on mandatory labeling in the EU demonstrates that mandatory labeling does
not necessarily have to signal the death knell of the biotechnology industry,436 and also represents an ultimate
acknowledgement by industry that they have a responsibility to respond to consumers' preferences, if only
as a matter of business survival. Although Monsanto has not changed its position on mandatory labeling in
the U.S., it would be dicult for the company to argue on principle against labeling in the U.S. when it has
News, May 7, 1998, available at 1998 WL 11008899.
432Id. In deciding to change its stance to favor labeling, Monsanto has followed the lead of the Euopean food industry, which
also initially opposed labeling requirements, but acquiesced to consumer demand when \they realized it was a battle they could
not win, [and] they began portraying the biotech label as a quality label, arguing that such products are safer than conventional
raw materials because they've been more thoroughly tested, and safer for the environment because they dramatically reduce
the use of plant protection chemicals in some cases. `We now see the biotech label as an opportunity rather than a potential
threat.' [stated a Nestle ocial]" Next Generation Biotech Products Will Face Traditional Labeling Issues in U.S., Maryanski
Notes, available at 1998 WL 10981464.
433Monsanto Changes Stand, supra note 431. \Indeed most agree that the next couple of years will be crucial for the future
of GM crops" and that although the biotech industry has until recently focused its marketing eorts on farmers, it has nally
realized that it must market its products with an eye to pleasing the end consumers making decisions in the grocery store.
Mike Phillips, a representative of the BIO, has stated that \it's nally dawning on Monsanto, as well as other companies, that
it's what the customer wants [that counts]." Martin Enserink, Industry Response: Agricultural Biotech Moves to Mollify Its
Critics, 286 Science 1666 (Nov 26, 1999), available at <http://www.sciencemag.org>.
434Enserink, supra note 433. This admitted arrogance is not hard to nd. On Monsanto Spokesman was on record as having
stated \Monsanto should not have to vouchsafe the safety of biotech food...Our interest in selling as much of it as possible.
Assuring its safety is the FDA's job." Playing God in the Garden, supra note 3.
435Enserink, supra note 433.
436Id. (\In the Netherlands, GM foods have carried the neutral phrase `produced with modern biotechnology' since 1997.
`There were some jitters at rst, but eventually sales have stabilized,' De Greef says")
95already acquiesced to labeling the EU. In fact, biotech companies may well have made a strategic mistake
in opposing labeling. Because the industry had no need to engage in the kind of consumer education that
would have been necessitated by a mandatory labeling regime, it essentially \left the public education to the
industry's foes."437 Moreover, because there was no need to educate and gain the condence of the consumers
buying the products in the grocery store, the biotech companies marketed the products towards farmers,438
and ultimately customized the benets of the biotech products towards farmers, not consumers.439 Con-
sumers are predisposed to be more wary of the risks posed by these products precisely because they gain no
salient benets from them. The industry's biggest obstacle to success is public acceptance.440
Ultimately, consumer acceptance is necessary in order to ensure the development of this technology, 441 just
as consumer acceptance is the key to the success of any other new product or technology. A recent article in
Nature magazine notes, \[t]he industry complains that the public has lost trust in its scientic experts, but
it will only make matters worse by declaring its own loss of trust in the judgment of the consumer. If labeling
all foods produced by GM techniques, as many argue, turn out to be a necessary step in regaining trust on
both sides, it could be a small price to pay."442 Even some government actors seem to have accepted that
the industry ultimately must bear the responsibility for the success or failure of this technology. Referring
to a labeling protocol to be applied to biotech food sold abroad, Quentin Kubicek, of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture has said that the key to selling bioengineered foods \will come from industry, not the U.S.
Government. A good product will sell abroad and make the protocol moot...It's up to industry."443 This
437Floyd Norris, How to Make a Scientic Breakthrough Seem Horrifying, N.Y. Times, Dec 17, 1999, available at 1999 WL
31760146.
438Who's Afraid, Economist, June 17, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7363493.
439Norris, supra note 437.
440Declan Butler, Biotech Industry Seeks \Honest Brokers," 398 Nature 360 (Apr. 1 1999).
441Dr. Cutberto Garza, co-chairman of the EU-U.S. Forums stated, \In order not to kill this technology we must gain
consumer acceptance and we must aim for the common ground." Marian Burros, Labeling Foods with Designer Genes, N.Y.
Times, January 3, 2001, available at <<http://wwww.nytimes.com2001/01/03/living/03WELL.html>>.
442Opinion, GM Foods Debate Needs A Recipe for Restoring Trust, 398 Nature, 639 (22 April 1999).
443Biosafety Protocol Could Impeded Biotech Trade, Analyst Warns, Food Chemical News, Nov. 15, 1998, available at 1998
WL 10981949.
96statement seems to be an acknowledgment that the ultimate responsibility for the success of biotechnology
(as with all other industries) lies with the industry and not the government, and oers a sharp contrast with
tone of the Coordinated Framework statements.444
B.
EU-US Biotechnology Consultative Forum
Increasingly, advocates on both sides have been noted the need for \honest brokers" trusted by the public
to evaluate the issues raised in the biotechnology debate.445 One potential candidate for the position of a
neutral broker is the EU-U.S. Biotechnology Consultative Forum. Created through an agreement between
the EU's President Prodi and President Clinton, and compromised of both EU and US experts in a broad
spectrum of elds related to the biotechnology issues (including scientists, lawyers, ethicists, consumer ac-
tivists, farmers, environmentalists, and business people), the Forum was charged with the task of writing a
\consensus report reecting the views and assessments of the benets and risks" of the use of biotechnology
in food and agriculture.446
Despite the broad range of disciplines and cultural and professional dierences involved, this group of Euro-
pean and American experts was able to come to a consensus. Notably, the report recommended mandatory
labeling requirements for genetically engineered products in both the EU and the U.S., 447 noting that
444The government's ocial stance towards regulation of biotechnology abroad in the Coordinated Framework was aggres-
sively pro-biotechnology, arguing that there was \no scientic basis for specic legislation for specic implementation of rDNA
technology and applications" and that members of the OECD should \examine their existing oversight and review mechanisms
to ensure that adequate review and control may be applied while avoiding undue burdens that may hamper technological
developments in this eld." 51 Fed. Reg. at 23308.
445Declan Butler, Biotech Industry Seeks \Honest Brokers," 398 Nature 360 (Apr. 1, 1999).
446The EU-U.S. Biotechnology Consultative Forum, Final Report, December 2000, 4, available at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/us/biotech/report.pdf> [hereinafter Final Report]
447The EU-U.S. Biotechnology Consultative Forum, Final Report, December 2000, 16, available at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/us/biotech/report.pdf>. The report recommended \content-based
mandatory labeling requirements for nished products containing novel genetic material." Id.
97\[c]onsumers should have the right of informed choice regarding the selection of what they want to con-
sume."448
In general, the Forum generated a much more cautionary attitude toward agricultural biotechnology than
the FDA's approach. For instance, one committee member, Dr. LeRoy B. Walters, a leading ethicist spe-
cializing in human gene transfer research, characterized the report as a \a reasonable middle ground [that]
provides an extra measure of safety for consumers. We need to treat biotech food more like new drugs or
food additives in the early years until we have a better picture of how they react in the human body."449
Moreover, the Forum advocated a much more inclusive regulatory process, arguing that the regulatory as-
sessment of risk should include a broad range public stakeholders, including \social scientists, ethicists,
representative of civil society," not exclusively scientists.450 The Forum also argued that the regulatory
process should take into account the public's preferences and aversions for particular kinds of risk including
\whether the risk is voluntary or involuntary, perceived benets, or whether the risk could cause hidden or
irreversible damage."451 The Forum further stated that \An inclusive regulatory system will also enable
decisions to be made in a way that respects societies' judgments of appropriate societal goals, ethical bound-
aries, and value concerns. Finally, an appropriate regulatory system will recognize and consider the special
concerns attending applications that break new ground."452 In short, the Forum advocated a regulatory
process and agenda that responds to public concerns.
Nevertheless, the Forum's recommendations do not bind any governmental body, European or American,
and it is not clear how the Bush Administration will choose to respond to the Forum's recommendation.453
Moreover, at least one committee member has argued that the recommendation would require labeling only
448Id. at 16. [Final Report]
449Marian Burros, Eating Well: Labeling Foods with Designer Genes, January 3, 2001 available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/02/living/03WELL.html>.
450Final Report, supra note 390 at 15.
451Final Report, supra note 390 at 15.
452Id.at 15.
453Andrew Pollack, Panel Backs Stronger Rules for Some Food, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2000, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/18/business/18FOODhhtml>.
98if the genetic engineering signicantly changed the food454 a standard that is arguably consistent with the
labeling position already taken by the FDA. Given the diversity of the Forum's membership, and the fact
that such a group was able to come to a consensus in this document, however, should give the Forum's
recommendation's at least moral legitimacy.
C.
Both the FDA and the Biotechnology Industry Need to Gain Consumer Trust
in Order to Ensure the Success of the Technology.
Fred H. Degnan, a legal commentator favoring the FDA's current labeling policy, has argued that \issues
of public trust" should be \kept distinct from the legal issues of essentiality and materiality" that govern
the FDA's labeling authority.455 However, this strict dichotomy between issues of public trust and issues
of FDA policy is misleading. The FDA will ultimately not be able to fulll its mission of protecting public
health if the public loses faith in the agency.
Ultimately, FDA credibility is the key to the agency's ability to regulate biotechnology eectively. Former
Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman has acknowledged that the success of biotechnology hinges to a large
part on \trust in the regulatory process."456 Unfortunately, consumer condence in the FDA may have been
damaged in the course of other recent food additive controversies such as the alar and saccharine debates.457
One commentator has argued \[b]ecause the FDA's credibility has been undermined, consumers are more
willing to listen to environmental and consumer groups on issues of food safety than they used to be."458
Ultimately, consumer \[c]ondence in the truthfulness, eectiveness, and completeness of the food label is
454Id. [Panel Backs Stronger Rules for Some Food]
455Fred H. Degnan, Biotechnology and the Food Label: A Legal Perspective, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 301, 309 (2000).
456Glickman Address, supra note 251.
457John Beiswenger, Note, Moving Beyond Risk in Assessing Technological Artifacts: The Case of Recombinant Bovine
Somatropin, 61 Vt. L. Rev. 667, 681 (1992).
458Id. at 681.
99in the interest of FDA, consumers, and industry alike."459
Even in arguing against calls for mandatory labeling, former FDA Commissioner Jane E. Henney acknowl-
edged for the necessity of consumer condence in food safety and in government agencies charged with
protecting that safety.460 Moreover, former Commissioner Henney has also indicated that the provision of
information is important for consumer acceptance, stating \[w]hat any product doesn't need is for there to
be suspicion on behalf of consumers that something is being slipped by them."461 Although this statement
was made in the context of the public disclosure of the clinical data on gene therapy and animal organ
transplants, the same argument also applies in the genetically engineered food context.
FDA's current labeling policy is likely to only further undermine consumer trust in the agency and the
underlying technology. Although the agency may continue to be rmly convinced that those advocating
mandatory labeling do not have a scientic leg to stand on, their adamant refusal to listen to consumers
may ultimately backre by further eroding public trust in the agency itself. As Monsanto has apparently
acknowledged in its grudging acceptance of consumer calls for labeling in Europe, regardless of biotechnol-
ogy's potential benets, the science depends on public acceptance in order to develop. Again in the words
of former Secretary Glickman, \[w]ith all that biotechnology has to oer, it is nothing if it's not accepted.
This boils down to a matter of trust|trust in the science behind the process, but particularly trust in the
regulatory process that ensures thorough review|including complete and open public involvement."462 The
credibility of the FDA, like the credibility of all other government agencies, is contingent in large part to the
public's condence that it is independent from the industries they regulate.463 Any hint of agency capture
risks alienating the public's condence. Moreover, at least some believe that the FDA's history of mini-
459Steven B. Steinborn & Kyra A. Todd, The End of Paternalism: A New Approach to Food Labeling, 54 Food & Drug L.J.
401, 422 (1999).
460Larry Thompson, Are Bioengineered Foods Safe, interview with Jane E. Henney, FDA Consumer, Jan-Feb 2000, available
at <<http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/dms/fdbioeng.html>>.
461Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Plans New Scrutiny in Areas of Biotechnology, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2001, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/18/health/18REGS.html>.
462Glickman Address, supra note 251.
463Glickman Address, supra note 251.
100mal regulation of agricultural biotechnology has only alienated public condence. Tucker of the Consumer
Federation of America has remarked, the regulation \process began under a cloud of political inuence and
managerial bean counting, and FDA has not dispelled that cloud."464
Until recently, FDA seems to have been built under the assumption that the American consumer has already
come to accept bioengineered food products. In 1993, Kessler noted that the public had initially feared
agricultural biotechnology, causing them to instinctively \distrust the scientist who developed [genetically
engineered plants], the companies who plan to market them, and the government that will regulate them"465
and that further the public's perception of GM foods summoned \scenes from a B movie `Attack of the
Killer Tomatoes"|where six feet high tomatoes roll down the street `burning, pillaging, and raping."466
Nevertheless, despite that early lack of trust of biotech foods, he argued that currently there is \widespread
acceptance" in the United States of agricultural biotechnology \among producers, consumers and policy-
makers"467
Although it is true that producers and policymakers have embraced this new technology, consumers' atti-
tudes toward this technology may not be most accurately characterized as \widespread acceptance." In fact,
in a recent international poll, 57% of Americans surveyed indicated that they were less likely to be foods
that were genetically modied,468 and only 4% reported being more likely to buy a food if it were genetically
engineered.469
Moreover, the FDA's own consumer focus groups ndings provide clear evidence that average Americans do
not realize that they are current eating GM foods.470 Most notable about this research is the how consumers
464Biotechnology in the year 2000 and Beyond, supra note 22 at 57.
465Judith E. Beach, No Killer Tomatoes': Easing Federal Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants, 53 Food & Drug L.J.
181, 181 (1998).
466Id. at 181-2.
467Judith E. Beach, No Killer Tomatoes': Easing Federal Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants, 53 Food & Drug
L.J. 181, 182 (1998), citing David A. Kessler, Remarks on Regulation of Food Biotechnology, Speech to the University of
Washington, Seattle, Washington (April 23, 1993).
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101react when informed of the prevalence of genetically engineered foods. Most consumers, even those who
consider themselves well informed about biotechnology, \register amazement" when informed of the degree
to which bioengineered foods have entered the food supply,471 and typically express \outrage that such a
change in the food supply could happen" without their being informed.472 Most importantly, this informa-
tion often undermined condence in both FDA and \served to reinforce the most negative and cynical views
some participants held about food biotechnology."473 Consumers expressed concern that GM foods had
been \'snuck into' the food supply"474 and interpreted this lack of disclosure in the marketplace as evidence
of a \conspiracy to consumers in the dark."475 Most importantly, some participants concluded that \the
rationale for not informing the public must be that there is something to hide."476 This is precisely the
kind of suspicion that most damages the credibility of the agency. Although the FDA may defend it's policy
as purely science based, this study indicated that consumers may be convinced of the very opposite. One
participant at the recent public hearings held by the FDA in Washington, D.C. stated, \It looks an awful
lot like the process of easy approval for transgenic foods is driven more by political inuence than by science
based concern for human health or the environment."477
By steadfastly refusing to mandate labeling, the FDA risks furthering the perception that it is in cahoots
with the biotech industry, undermining its own credibility, and furthering distrust of the underlying technol-
ogy. The Consumer Focus Group results only conrm Glickman's observation that it \does America little
good to be seen `force-feeding genetically modied organisms down people's throats."'478 Consumers in the
focus groups expressed \skepticism that the interests of consumers are suciently taken into account by
Focus Groups on Biotechnology 6 (Oct. 20, 2000), available at <http://www.cfsan.fda/gov/comm/biorpt.html>. [here-
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102other actors [responsible for developing agricultural biotechnology policy]. Some participants complained
that consumers are being used as `guinea pigs' and many were doubtful that government regulators and sci-
entists have the ability to counteract the powerful prot motives of industry and producers."479 Ultimately,
a policy that results in consumers not getting information about a dramatic change in the way the food
they eat is produced and dismissing concerns about the technology as \irrational and unscientic" will do
\do little to win hearts and minds." 480 Although the American public has much more condence in the
FDA's ability to protect the public health than Europeans have in their regulatory agencies,481 it is hardly
surprising that even Americans do not react positively when they learn about a major change in the food
supply which has occurred without their knowledge.
Moreover, public distrust of the biotech industry might be due to more than just sheer ignorance or panic.
According to a recent study by the National Science Board, well-educated Americans have less favorable
attitudes towards genetic engineering than ve years ago.482 Moreover, it is likely that this distrust may
be directed less at the underlying science, than at the biotech industry.483 In fact, it is possible that the
intense protests about the introduction of biotech foods to the marketplace in Britain \was driven as much
by public suspicion about the motives of large companies as by unease about biotechnology."484 According
to Dorothy Nelkin, a professor of sociology at NYU specializing in science and law, \[c]ommercialization [of
technology] enhances mistrust"485 The best way to counter consumer concerns about the commercialization
of this technology may be to ensure that the FDA truly is independent and concerned solely with protecting
the consumer interests.
Although the FDA has not ocially commented on the fact that its own focus groups largely called for label-
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103ing, other government ocials have acknowledged this consumer demand for labeling. For instance, Frank
Loy, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Global Aairs has stated, \I have a sense that the consumers have
spoken, and they say: `We want the damned stu labeled...so one ought to discuss labels."486 Similarly, at a
1997 speech, Glickman voiced the opinion that \At the end of the day...some type of informational labeling
is likely to happen."487 This rather calm acceptance to labeling is in sharp contrast to his earlier stated
position that segregation of foods on the basis of genetic modication was \scientically unfounded and
commercially impossible," and his strong opposition to mandatory labeling just two years earlier.488 Even
some scientists have even voiced the opinion that genetically engineered foods will eventually be labeled.489
Labeling can help build consumer trust. As the most eective way to inform consumers about the genetically
engineered content of their food, labeling can represent a \necessary rst step" in starting a honest public
dialogue about the risks and benets of these products.490 By bringing the consumers into the debate,
FDA labeling policy can play a vital role in promoting consumer condence in the technology, the industry,
and the FDA.491 As Whittaker has noted, \[o]nly open communication and prudent education will help to
establish condence in bio-engineered products. For the typical consumer, communication and education
begins with labeling."492
Moreover, the FDA should acknowledge that consumer demands for labeling of genetically modied foods
are not irrational. As Philip R. Reilly has written in a very recent article in the Annual Review of Genomics
and Human Genetics, \the public reaction to GMOs is...a rational response to the discovery that a major
486Enserink, supra note 433.
487Glickman Address, supra note 251.
488Beach, supra note 467 at 187, citing European Stance on Labeling Genetically Modied Crops Prompts Farm Chemicals
Association Response, Food labeling & Nutrition News, July 17, 1997, at 11.
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er
full information; to regulate openly and responsibly; and to ensure that the benets of genetic engineering are seen to go not
only to companies. Doing all of this would go a long way to allying people's fears about GM food|and might even persuade
them of its potential benets.")
104change has taken place in the world that was conducted largely without public knowledge."493 The notion
that the large scale introduction of genetically modied foods into grocery stores signals a major change in
our food supply is by no means a novel or unfamiliar argument. Although biotech companies usually stress
the similarity of genetically engineered foods to conventional foods when facing for demands for labeling, in
other contexts they are happy to tout their products as unique and revolutionary when touting the benets of
biotechnology to feed the world and save the planet.494 The industry portrays its products \as the linchpins
of a biological revolution|part of a `new agricultural paradigm' that will make farming more sustainable,
feed the world, and improve health and nutrition|and, oddly enough, the same old stu, at least so far as
those at the eating end of the food chain should be concerned."495 Similarly, at least some government ac-
tors involved in the regulation of these foods grasp the signicance of the approval of these foods for human
consumption. For instance, one member of a government advisory panel responsible for determining the
safety of the FravrSavr tomato remarked, \We are changing the relationship between humans and nature on
a scale of the industrial revolution."496 The grand pronouncements about the signicance of the technology
undermine FDA arguments that genetically engineered products are simply extensions of traditional plant
breeding techniques.
Although science has an important role to play in determining the risks and benets of genetically engineered
food products, the issue of labeling cannot ultimately be determined by science. Negative public reactions to
the realization that these foods have not been labeled have as much to do with people's feeling of disenfran-
chisement in making fundamental decisions about what they put into their bodies as they do with concerns
about the long-term safety of these products. FDA's concerns that not all information can be required on the
food label represents are legitimate. Nevertheless, given the major change in food production that genetic
493Reilly, supra note 9 at p 502.
494Playing God in the Garden, supra note 4.
495Id.
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105engineering represents, the case for including information about genetic engineering on food labels represents
is particularly strong.
Moreover, any case against labeling based on a fear of a consumer overreaction to information about genetic
engineering should be regarded with suspicion. In a market economy, consumers should be allowed to make
decisions based on their preferences|not solely based on the government or scientists' conclusion about what
food products are safe. Like any other food product, foods containing genetically engineered ingredients need
to compete on the basis of consumers' preferences, no matter how irrational or unscientic. Although the
government has a proper role in determining that products marketed for human consumption meet some
basic threshold safety requirement, it has no proper role in withholding information about those products
in order to inuence consumers' purchasing choices.497
Similarly, democratic principles weigh in favor of giving consumers information about the products they
are purchasing. One of the most telling results of the FDA's Consumer Focus Group results was the angry
reaction of the consumers' when told of the prevalence of GM foods in their grocery stores. As citizens in a
democracy, these participants naturally assumed that they would be informed about major changes in the
food supply. The participants recognized that having this information about the genetically modied status
of their food is a basic precondition both to their being able to make food decisions on an individual basis,
as well as to their ability to monitor government regulation of these products.
Although scientists or regulators may dismiss citizens' risk preferences and aversions as unscientic or un-
substantiated, in a democracy, laypeople must be allowed to express and act on those preferences. In fact,
\democracy is by denition a system of rule by the inexpert."498 Moreover, in many cases, the preferences
dismissed by scientists as unscientic are not based on factual beliefs, but rather represent value judgments.
497It seems that this is why the FDA does nothing to discourage consumers from purchasing Ho-hos, Twinkies, and Ben and
Jerry's ice cream. Although there are clearly healthier alternatives on the market, consumers are free to make purchasing
decisions that are strongly inuenced by irrational and unscientic principles like taste and marketing.
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106Such value judgments are precisely the kinds of issues to be resolved by the polity at large rather than a
small cadre of technocrats. For instance, the aversion to risks that could harm future generations, children,
or risk aversion generally, all represent important and socially constructive value judgments that common
citizens should be able to express and have reected through government policy and personal purchasing
decisions. Moreover, Slovik's research strongly indicates that the risk assessments of scientists themselves
are also shaped by their own personal world views, suggesting that scientists' conclusions are not necessarily
more \rational" than public opinion.499
Although FDA's primary role is to protect the public health, it should not use its power in order to sub-
vert the public's preferences in the name of protecting public health. Such a regulatory stance is at best
paternalistic. This is perhaps why the FDA does not ocially express this reasoning as a justication for
refusing to label. Nevertheless, the FDA's stated justication for refusing to call for mandatory labeling:
that information about genetic engineering is not material because scientic evidence does not indicate that
it is material is ultimately unconvincing, particularly since so many scientists themselves have argued that
the research data is not complete enough, and that no risk analysis has been done to date. Statutory analysis
clearly indicates that the FDA has ample regulatory authority to regulate genetically modied foods much
more stringently and to require labeling of these foods.
Ultimately, the decision whether or not to apply labels to foods containing genetically modied ingredients
is a political one. Slovic has argued that \dening risk is ...an exercise in power."500 Labeling decisions
also represent an exercise in power. The labeling issue raises fundamental issues about the distribution of
information between food producers and consumers. Although scientic data plays a role to play in deter-
mining the relevance of information, the ultimate decision over whether or not to require labeling essentially
represents a political question. Scientists may be able to provide important information about the known
499Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, supra note 393 at 83.
500Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, supra note 393 at 95.
107risks and benets of a particular product, but science does not answer questions about what kinds of risks
consumers should be aware of, or what kinds of preferences consumers should be allowed to express. These
are issues of judgment that should properly be determined in the realm of public debate.
Even if the FDA is convinced that public judgments and risk preferences are irrelevant for purposes of la-
beling policy, the agency still has a strong vested interest in maintaining public trust in the agency. The
FDA will be unable to carry out its mission of protecting public health if it loses the trust of the public.
The EU-US Biotechnology Consultative Forum Final report noted that credibility of democratic institutions
is often tied the \transparency of decision-making" and the participation of all relevant stakeholders.501
In fact, the report noted that a \[l]ack of trust jumps across seemingly unrelated areas of regulation and
policy."502
Ultimately, scientic evidence and assurances cannot quell public concerns unless the public has faith in the
science and agencies that produce and rely on such data.503 Moreover, \[i]n the absence of trust, science
(and risk assessment) can only feed public concerns, by uncovering more bad news"504 Trust is an essential
element of eective communication between the FDA and consumers. Moreover, this trust in an institution,
once created, must be safeguarded vigilantly since it is dicult to establish, but very easily destroyed.505
In fact, the public is likely to view information that challenges their trust in an institution as more plau-
sible than information that would reinforce condence in the institution,"506 and \distrust, once initiated,
tends to reinforce and perpetuate distrust."507 Without trust, no communication from the FDA will ever
be eective.508 In fact, trying to counter concerns about risk with raw scientic data will often only serve
501Final Report, supra note 390 at 6.
502Final Report, supra note 390 at 6.






108to \exacerbate conict," particularly when the key point of conict is about a value judgment.509 Distrust
in public institutions only serves to feed the perception that \risks are unacceptably high."510
Scientists, as well as other stakeholders, have acknowledged the need for public trust: \it behooves government|
and industry|to build long-term public condence by establishing strict rules to ensure safety and choice
for consumers and to safeguard the environment."511 Glickman also acknowledged the need to secure public
condence. He stated, \[n]ow, more than ever, with these technologies in their relative infancy, I think it's
important that, as we encourage the development of these new food production systems, we cannot blindly
embrace their benets. We have to ensure public condence"512
FDA is in an ideal position to serve in an \honest broker" role in the agricultural biotechnology debate. In
fact, the United States is one of the few western democracies that has a trusted food and drug regulatory
agency like the FDA.513 And recent controversies notwithstanding, the public still has a great deal of trust in
the agency.514 However, the FDA's ability to protect the public health is largely dependent on the public's
faith in the integrity and independence of the agency.515 FDA's position that it's current policies are based
solely on scientic evidence while critics are merely motivated by political, or unscientic concerns{contrary
evidence notwithstanding{may ultimately further undermine trust in the agency.
Moreover, the FDA's argument that it's labeling policy is based purely on science is further undermined by
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513Food for Thought, supra note 157. (\European governments have a distressingly bad record of suppressing `inconvenient'
scienti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109the fact that some scientists have recently advocated labeling for reasons other than simply assuring public
safety. They argue that labeling of GM foods might be necessary to trace any long-term increases in allergies
or diseases to GM foods.516 These scientists caution that absent the ability to trace the health eects of GM
foods through labeling requirements, \any unanticipated health impact" of GM food would be undetectable
by any agency except in the case of a \monumental disaster."517 Thus, labeling could actually be a necessary
step in studying the long-term health eects of genetically modied foods.
D. The Second Generation of Bioengineered Foods
In any case, recent developments in the agricultural biotechnology industry may make the current labeling
debate moot. The biotech foods currently under development, deemed \second generation" bioengineered
foods, are more likely to reect the preferences of consumers.518 Such consumer driven changes may improve
the taste of a particular product, increase the products health benets, or decrease the allergenic properties
of the food.519
The FDA has signaled that these \second-generation" products may be more likely to be subject to manda-
tory labeling requirements than the rst generation counterparts, depending on their eects on nutrition.520
The fact that such bioengineered foods would be characterized by dierent nutritional qualities than their
conventional counterparts may trigger mandatory labeling even under the FDA's current materiality analy-
sis.521 Moreover, some scientists have suggested that functional foods may require the introduction of more
complex genetic traits than those currently on the market, and may require more thorough safety review
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110comparable to the kinds of testing required of new drugs entering the market.522 Thus, the development of
the technology to cater the biotech to consumers' preferences may itself bring about the labeling of those
foods, and greater safety testing.
Moreover, as the foods themselves are designed to fulll consumer needs and desires, producers will have
built-in incentives to label them because the value of such foods for marketing purposes would depend on
the manufacturer's ability to keep them separated from their traditional counterparts.523 Moreover, even
some GM foods not explicitly designed to respond to consumer preferences may require identity labeling if,
as in the case of the Flavr Savr Tomato, the product must be handled dierently from conventionally grown
products.524
Consumers are much more likely to be accepting of GM foods if they can directly reap benets from those
foods.525 Thus, if the second generation of genetically engineered foods truly oer the consumer benets that
the biotech companies are promising, the companies may be much more successful in convincing consumers
to accept such foods.
Ultimately, the developing a strong and credible policy for GM foods requires both a commitment to strong
scientic principles and an acknowledgment of the importance of the eating public's interests in a changing
food supply. According to Dr. Peter Kareiva, senior ecologist for cumulative risk assessment at the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, answers to the questions raised by biotechnology \will not come
just from `handing o a science answer like a stone tablet from the mountaintop."'526 He further argues that
\any decision about what to do next will be determined not only by the magnitude of the risks and benets,
determined by scientists, but by the value placed on them by those making the decisions."527
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111FDA's current approach simply does not address the public's real concerns. The FDA's own consumer focus
group study found that \[v]irtually all participants" favored labeling, and that \[v]irtually no one mentioned
wanting to know the specic eects of bioengineering on the product as a reason for labeling. Instead, partic-
ipants wanted to know whether the food was a product of biotechnology because they were concerned about
the potential for unknown long-term eects of the technology."528 Moreover, FDA's assurances pointing to
the absence of evidence proving that biotech foods are dangerous are not likely to truly address consumer
concerns. As stated by Dr. Goldberg, \when you ask...[whether] these products [are] dangerous, I think
you are asking the wrong question. Foods are not like pesticides. We don't ask are they dangerous; we ask
are foods safe, and that is the question that the food and Drug Administration should be asking."529
Given the degree of scientic uncertainty about genetic engineering and the exibility accorded to the FDA
in the relevant labeling regulations, FDA's labeling policy represents a political calculation with political
implications. While the FDA may consider the risk of consumer overreaction to a mandatory labeling regime
to be unacceptably high, it should at least acknowledge that its labeling policy rests on these kinds of judg-
ments, rather than on scientic evidence. Ultimately, labeling policy rests in large part on the discretion of
the FDA. While scientic evidence about risks should inform the decisionmaking, such evidence ultimately
cannot and should not determine such a discretionary decision.
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